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Was
Carl Henry A Rationalist?
by G. Wright Doyle
*This paper
is a short version of what Dr. Doyle has written in his book,
Carl Henry: Theologian for All Seasons which is
available from Amazon.com
here.
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Perhaps the most commonly-voiced criticism against Henry
is that of being a rationalist,
and therefore a prisoner of the now-defunct modern project. Bob
Patterson, for example, writes that: "Not all
evangelicals are happy with Henry’s bent toward rationalism."
Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson note that his “critics have also
found him to be overly concerned with reason and propositional
revelation.”
Donald Bloesch says, “The method of Gordon Clark and Carl
Henry is deductive, deriving conclusions from given rational
principles”
In the same vein, Gordon Lewis and Bruce Demarest call Henry and
his mentor Gordon Clark deductive rationalists.
Still, the accusations of rationalism reflected above
pale in comparison to the words of Harvey Conn’s repetition and
affirmation of Van Til’s description of the approaches of
“Neo-evangelicals”:
These men… accept… an emphasis on “the law of
non-contradiction” (Carnell) or “logic as an exercise of the
reason to test for truth” (Gordon Clark) or what Van Til
designates as “Greek theism” (Carl Henry) as one of their
operating categories or presuppositions. And precisely here lies
the basic weakness of this sort of apologetics. “It is the
attempt to join higher forms of non-Christian thought in their
opposition to lower forms of non-Christian thought…”
What is “Rationalism”?
Rationalism has been defined as a “conviction that reason
provides the best or even the only path to truth… In theology
the term rationalism often designates a position that
subordinates revelation to human reason or rules out revelation
as a source of knowledge altogether.”
M.J. Ovey reminds us that “rationalism” carries negative
overtones in several communities, and provides a helpful
discussion of some of the term’s meanings.
“Rationalism” receives criticism from Christians if it
means “the supremacy and adequacy of human reason” to discover
truth.
“Romantic”
critics claim that rationalism rules out love and exhibits
“sterility and inability to explain the richness of human
experience.”
Post-moderns reject rationalism for the latter reason, as well
as from their reaction to any assertion of ultimate, absolute
truths, and the assumption that reason can decipher and describe
the multiple mysteries of life.
In Christian apologetics, “rationalism” may describe the
conviction that “if proper evidence is produced in favor of
Christian faith a listener will, as a rational being, inevitably
come to faith” or that “rational” evidence for the truth claims
of the Bible are
sufficient to persuade an honest seeker.
As Ovey rightly points out, “The current climate of
postmodernism is unfavourable to rationalism in many of the
above senses.” Postmoderns reject the idea of any universal
truth (except their own assertion of universal relativism!) and
suspect that “reason” is only a weapon in the hands of those
with an agenda. “For this reason the charge that Christian
belief is ‘rationalist’ can be devastating in a postmodern
context.”
When Henry’s opponents brand his theological method as
“rationalistic,” therefore, they score a rhetorical victory
without really having to substantiate their charge.
Response to Criticisms of Rationalism
In the rest of this paper, I shall try to show tha: Carl
Henry’s thought does not fit in any sense the standard
definitions of “rationalism” given above. That is, he does not
believe that reason alone can ascertain ultimate truth; he does
not give reason priority over God’s revelation in the Bible; and
he does not believe that rational evidence alone will persuade
anyone to believe in Christ.
At the outset, let us note that Carl Henry himself
repeatedly and unequivocally renounced and repudiated
rationalism. Early in Volume One, for example, he highlights the
reliance of all reasoning upon assumptions and presuppositions.
A chapter on “Theology and Philosophy” in the same volume
explains why the evangelical theologian cannot accept the
anti-metaphysical bias of much modern philosophy:
The speculative approach ignores the self-revelation of
the living God and
it propounds a rationalistic world view and life view on
antithetical premises. In so doing it
minimizes man’s finiteness and conceals his epistemic
predicament in sin.
Such explicit rejection of rationalism puts the burden of
proof upon those who would deny that Carl Henry understood his
own theological method. To label Carl Henry a “rationalist”
because he does not disavow the use of reason is akin to calling
Karl Marx a capitalist because of the title of his book; one has
to amass considerable evidence to support such an allegation.
The criticisms quoted above state that Henry’s supposed
“rationalism” is marked by being “overly concerned with reason
and prepositional revelation.”
We shall look in more detail at some possible meanings of
“being overly concerned with reason,” but for now perhaps we
might ask, What does “overly concerned” imply?
More concerned with human reason than with
divine revelation? The first four volumes of
God, Revelation, and
Authority constitute a mammoth attempt to assert the nature,
means, and priority of divine revelation, particularly written
revelation in the Bible.
More concerned with reason than with emotions? Yes, if
you mean emotions as a vehicle for revelation. Henry is not a
Romantic. On the other hand, throughout his writings he affirms
his belief in what Jonathan Edwards would call “religious
affections” as essential to a normal Christina life, and in his
autobiography refers several times to his own emotional
responses to God’s goodness and greatness.
More than intuition? If by intuition we mean ineffable
mystical intuitions, Henry counters that “mystical intuitionism
is implicitly pantheistic. It obscures both the transcendence of
the Creator-God and man’s moral waywardness… While there is a
mystery side to God, revelation is mystery dispelled and conveys
information about God and his purposes.”
Still, there is a kind of “rational intuitionism” held by
Augustine, Calvin, and others, including Henry, which believes
that “human beings know certain propositions are immediately to
be true, without resort to inference.”
These would include the existence of God and the sense of right
and wrong, the awareness of self, the laws of logic, and the
truths of mathematics. “According to this view, the categories
of thought are aptitudes for thought implanted by the Creator
and synchronized with the whole of created reality.”
What about reason as distinct from experience? Henry
points out that Thomistic theology builds upon sense impressions
as a foundation, and that this made it vulnerable to later
secular philosophical attack. He describes the weakness of
modern empiricism, especially scientific empiricism and logical
positivism, and asserts that it can never lead to anything but
tentative conclusions. Divine revelation alone can provide
certitude.
What, then, is the role of reason? Very
early in God, Revelation, and Authority, Henry lays bare
the assumptions of what he calls “the rationalistic method of
knowing” that “considers human reasoning as the only reliable
and valid source of knowledge.”
After tracing the course and fortunes of rationalism in Western
philosophy, Henry declares that faith in the role of human
reason has been shattered in recent years, thus acknowledging
trends which later came to be called “postmodernism.” From a
Christian standpoint, “Human reason is not a source of
infallible truth about ultimate reality,” because man is both
finite and fallen.
There is no way that any created person could know all that is
necessary for “a comprehensive world-life view,” and the “sinful
human spirit slants its own perspectives in a manner that does
violence to the truth of revelation, while its very formulations
are at the same time made possible because reason is a divine
gift whose legitimate and proper use man has compromised.”
That last clause points to the other side
of Henry’s view of reason: Its “legitimate and proper use.”
Throughout God, Revelation, and Authority, he strenuously
opposes the view that “reason must in principle be
antirevelational…A deity related to man only in terms of
contradiction and paradox can serve neither the cause of
revelation, reason or experience.”
He espouses, therefore, an “evangelical rational theism.”
That is, a theism based on God’s revelation, and not warped by
irrational, self-contradictory assertions. Its fundamental
assumption – derived from the Bible – is that “the Logos of God
is the coordinating reality that holds together thought, life
and experience.”
“Its basic premise is that the living God should be allowed to
speak for himself and to define the abiding role of reason and
the meaning of revelation… The rationalistic approach
subordinates the truth of revelation to its own alternatives and
has speculated itself into exhaustion.” Our choice now is
between “human postulation or divine revelation.”
To continue with the criticisms quoted above, he is
faulted for following a
fundamentally deductive method. That is, “deriving
conclusions from given rational principles.”
If this means that Henry has fundamental presuppositions,
it is true. He starts with the premise that the entire Bible is
the Word of God, our only infallible guide to faith and
practice. He insists that we must derive our theology from clear
statements and legitimate inferences from the Scriptures, not
from extra-biblical considerations or concepts. Indeed, most of
God, Revelation, and Authority consists of a sustained
defense of the Bible as the only proper starting point for
theological reflection; Henry repeatedly criticizes those
approaches which arise from human ideas and speculation.
Furthermore, he operates on the conviction that the Bible
contains information about God and his ways that is clear enough
to be understood. “God in his revelation is the first principle
of Christian theology, from which all the truths of revealed
religion are derived.”
He knows that the Bible conveys not only information, and is
intended to lead us to real wisdom – the saving knowledge of God
– but he insists that the words in the Bible do reflect, and
communicate, intelligible revelation from God.
But here we must be careful, for Henry thinks that these
assumptions arise from a proper reading of the Bible itself. In
other words, he did not start with these ideas and construct a
theological system upon them. Rather, his preliminary encounter
with the Bible as a new believer convinced him that this is the
very Word of God, a Word which could be comprehended enough to
communicate also with others. So, even his presuppositions arose
from his response to what he read in the Scriptures. “The
Christian religion does not dangle midair on a postulational
skyhook; it is anchored in God’s self-revelation.”
He has also been charged with:
“Advocating a God who reveals himself only in Euclidean terms…”
Euclid was a Greek mathematician, famous for his textbook
on geometry, the Elements, which argued from axioms to
theorems to produce proofs, concluding with the confident, “Q.E.D.”
Let us assume that this criticism refers to Henry’s
belief that theology is, in some sense, a “science,” “in the
deepest sense because it presumes to account in an intelligible
and orderly way for whatever is legitimate in every sphere of
life and learning.”
Of course, Christian theology differs fundamentally from
much of modern science, for it does not base itself only – or
even chiefly – upon empirical observation derived by the senses,
and because it does not exalt human reason above divine
revelation as its fundamental way of knowing. But theology, like any
body of knowledge (the original sense of “science”), “is
interested no less than any other science in discussing
presuppositions and principles, sources and data, purposes or
objectives, methods of knowing, verifiability and falsifiability”.
This way of speaking of theology grates upon modern
Christian sensibilities, accustomed as they are to think of
faith as personal rather than propositional. Our age has lost
confidence in “the assured results of science,” and yearns for
experience that is not simply cognitive and rational.
So, we must ask what Henry means. Does he – as the
criticism quoted above implies – think that our God is a set of
impersonal mathematical proofs, known by cold reasoning and
ironclad logic? Of course not! That is a caricature, possible
only to those who have not read his works carefully.
Henry merely means to say that God has revealed himself
in such a way that he can be known, his revelation can be
understood, the Bible makes sense, and we can talk about God in
ways that others can understand. Indeed, those theologians who
criticize Henry for being “scientific” themselves try to
persuade others by the facts and the logic of their argument!
Most Christian writers seek to present their case cogently and
coherently, which is all that Henry says he is assaying to do.
To be sure, Henry does speak of axioms and theorems as
appropriate for theology, but does this mean that he envisions a
process that is coldly mathematical and leads merely to a set of
rationally-deduced principles, rather than a vital knowledge of
the living God? Not at all. He is simply trying to recognize
that systematic theology, by definition, is systematic –
it seeks to present the doctrines of the Bible in an orderly,
consistent, and coherent fashion.
For Henry, then, “axioms” and “theorems” refer to vital
truths derived from the Bible and presented in a way that shows
their mutual inter-relatedness. Far from being a set of random
observations of, and responses to, the revelation of the
Scriptures, theology aims to arrange the treatment of biblical
themes in a way that makes sense and carries persuasive power.
We must admit that Henry possibly did not realize the
extent to which his use of the noun “science” to describe
theology would generate massive opposition, approaching
revulsion, among evangelicals. Though he did his best to define
what he meant by “science” and was obviously aware of the revolt
against “modern” rationalism, and science in particular, as we
have seen, he did not, perhaps, appreciate how viscerally some
evangelicals would react to his use of terms like “reason,”
“rational,” “axiom,” and “theorem.”
Or did he? Much of his theological project was aimed at
combating the rising anti-rationalism, even irrationalism, of
twentieth-century theology, and he often lamented the
emotionalism, shallowness, and fuzzy thinking of all too many
evangelical leaders and thinkers. Maybe he chose his terms
deliberately, in an almost desperate attempt to rescue a baby
that was in danger of being thrown out with the bathwater.
“Insisting that religious beliefs and moral convictions stand up to the
test of logic and reason.”
Henry admits: “To be sure [evangelical theology] insists
that reason is the test of truth. But by true knowledge it means
nothing more or less than truth as God knows and reveals it.”
In other words, Henry believes that the Bible,
which is God’s self-revelation of the truth, will not contradict
itself. Reason does not invent truth; it discovers truth by
carefully examining the scriptural witness.
Divine revelation is the source of all
truth, the truth of Christianity included; reason is the
instrument for recognizing it; Scripture is its verifying
principle; logical consistency is a negative test for truth and
coherence a subordinate test. The task of Christian theology is
to exhibit the content of biblical revelation as an orderly
whole..
Divine revelation is thus the “basic
theological axiom” of Christian theology.
This fact “in no way nullifies the corollary truth that the
triune God is Christianity’s basic ontological axiom.”
In other words, Henry is not unaware that theology is primarily
about God; he is merely saying that to know God, we must
seek the truth as it is found in his revelation, especially in
the Bible.
“Placing an undue emphasis on ‘the law of non-contradiction.’”
Carl Henry certainly did insist that the law of
non-contradiction plays a crucial role in all human thought and
discourse:
Distinctively human experience presupposes the law
of non-contradiction and the irreducible
distinction between
truth and error; man cannot repudiate these logical
presuppositions without sacrificing the intelligibility of what he says
and does and his own mental coherence.
In other words, Van Til, Conn, McGrath, and others who
disparage the emphasis that Henry (and his mentor Gordon Clark)
place on the law of non-contradiction can do so only by assuming
that same “law”! With regard to this matter, either Henry is
right or he is wrong; he cannot be both right and wrong at the
same time. And his critics say he is wrong!
What does “wrong” mean, unless there is a fundamental
contradiction between “right” and “wrong,” between truth and
error?
To claim that Henry believes that the “law of
non-contradiction” exists independently of God is to misunderstand
his thought. After all, the Bible declares that “God is light,
and in him there is no darkness at all,”
he cannot lie,
and Jesus is the Truth.
All such descriptions of God imply something like a “law of
non-contradiction” within God himself. Not, of course, as an
independent “law” standing outside of God that he must obey, but
as part of the fundamental constitution of the mind of God – of
the Logos – which distinguishes between truth and error, “light”
and “darkness,” good and evil, holy and profane, right and
wrong.
It is in the context of God’s sovereignty
and total freedom that Henry discusses the nature of the law of
non-contradiction,
which “does not set limits to which God must conform; God
himself wills the law of
non-contradiction
as integral to both divine and human meaning… The laws of logic
are the way God thinks; they are the organization of the divine
mind.”
God cannot speak what is both true and false at the same time;
indeed, he cannot directly speak anything that is false
(excluding from this discussion the record of Satan’s lies in
the Bible). He cannot lie. He has bound himself to truth,
for his very mind – his Logos – is truth itself.
Thus, when Henry speaks of the “law” of
non-contradiction, he is only referring to a “law” that
underlies all human thought and communication, one that is
assumed in everything we say and do. This “law” is implanted in
us because we are created in the image of God, who distinguishes
absolutely between truth and error, fact and falsehood, reality
and non-reality, God and not-God.
In his own words:
The laws of logic are the “architecture” or
organization of the divine mind. They are the systematic
arrangement of God’s mind or the way God thinks. The laws of
logic, therefore, have an ultimate ontological reality. God is
the author of all meaning, the foundation of all facts; his
thought is ultimately decisive for all predication.
We simply cannot escape the fact that our minds
distinguish between truth and error, and that all our value
judgments assume and express this basic element of our mental
nature.
Another point: Not only Christians, but all humans, think
and speak out of this fundamental reality. God addresses humans
as “reasonable” (that is, capable of reason) beings. That is
what Henry means by the universal presence of the law of
non-contradiction in both humans and in their Maker. Or, as he
puts it, “Those who argue that God is illogical and then presume
to say anything ontologically significant about him, indulge in
religious babbling.”
Being “overly concerned with … prepositional revelation.”
True, Henry does insist upon prepositional revelation
throughout
God,
Revelation, and Authority
and especially in Volume III Chapters 24-28.
If revelation is a communication of
sharable truth, it will consist of sentences, propositions,
judgments, and not simply of isolated concepts.
God… does not utter illogicalities…
Meaningful divine revelation involves communication in
intelligible sentences.
Another objection is that “prepositional truth
depersonalizes revelation by turning it into abstract statements
that dull the call for decision and obedience… But if the call
for decision and obedience rests upon imperatives that cannot be
logically analyzed, and are not answerable to the claims of
truth, then no rational creature ought to be bound by such
demands.”
He goes on:
A reading of the New Testament will quickly
show…that the verb believe (pisteuo) does in fact
have doctrinal truths or propositional statements as its object;
it is therefore untrue to the Gospels and Epistles to say that
the object of belief is properly only a person.
A proposition is a verbal statement that is either true
or false; it is a rational declaration capable of being either
believed, doubted, or denied.
We mean by propositional revelation that
God supernaturally communicates his revelation to chosen
spokesmen in the express forms of cognitive truths, and that the
inspired prophetic-apostolic proclamation reliably articulates
these truths in sentences that are not internally contradictory..
Is God “more” than what he has revealed in the Bible? Of
course! But without the propositional revelation in the Bible,
we would not know of this transcendence of God. “Apart from
meaningful and true cognitive information, one could not
know that a presence is that of Yahweh, or speak confidently of
God’s personality and selfhood, or even of transcendent
reality.”
After these preliminary definitions and answers to objections, Henry backs his position with an extensive review of the
Scriptures, which he finds to be composed of intelligible
statements, though of course expressed in various genres, such
as poetry. But “The LORD is my shepherd” is still a proposition.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim by Roger Olson that
“Henry’s view of divine revelation may seem to imply that all
the nonpropositional forms of revelation are unimportant
compared with propositional revelation,”
Henry states explicitly that “The Bible itself attests the
considerable variety in God’s revealing activity by depicting
divine disclosure not by one particular term but by a vast range
of descriptive concepts.”
Against those who would restrict God’s revelation to the Bible
itself, he writes, “The God of the Bible is the God who revealed
himself in dreams and visions, in theophany and incarnation, in
words and writings. His multiform ways of revelation defy
simplistic reduction.”
Henry understands that not everything in the Bible is a
proposition:
It is the case that in the Bible God not
only reveals sentences, or propositional truths, but also
reveals his Name, or names, and that he gives divine commands.
Commands do not assert a truth and are not propositions. Such
disclosures assuredly are capable of being formulated
propositionally, but that is admittedly something other than
expressly identifying them as propositional disclosure. Yet even
the revelation of God’s name requires a meaningful context for
intelligibility; isolated concepts do not convey truths…
If it is too much to say that divine
revelation must be propositionally given to be both meaningful
and true, it is nonetheless wholly necessary to insist that
divine disclosure does indeed take propositional form.
One last point to make on this subject: Those who say
that revelation is not propositional do so with an abundance of
propositions, which they expect to be believed.
Those who think Carl Henry too “rationalistic” naturally
think he is constantly
Forgetting that “our theology will forever fall short of the mind of God
… [and that] we do not possess the truth, since reason is always
the servant and never the master or determiner of revelation.”
The third of his
Fifteen Theses on Divine Revelation states clearly that “Divine
revelation does not completely erase God’s transcendent mystery,
inasmuch as God the Revealer transcends his own revelation.
The revelation given to man is not exhaustive of God. The God of
revelation transcends his creation, transcends his activity,
transcends his own disclosure. We do not ‘see everything from
God’s point of view.’ Even the chosen apostles concede that
their knowledge on the basis of divine revelation is but ‘in
part’ and not yet ‘face to face’ (1 Cor. 13:12).”
Therefore, “It is sheer delusion for any contemporary
theologian, however devout or gifted, to think
that he or she has fully mastered God’s truth as God knows it.”
.
On the other hand, “Although we cannot know God
exhaustively, we can know him truly and adequately. Although we
cannot know him apart from our finitude, we can know him as
creatures divinely intended to apprehend their Creator. Although
we can know him only through the forms of our understanding,
these divinely created forms convey reliable knowledge about
God.”
Henry is also faulted for:
Holding that “the truth of revelation can be known prior to becoming a
Christian,” “giving
reason a creative role prior to faith,” and not emphasizing
enough “the idea that the unbeliever’s mind is depraved and the
believer’s mind is enlightened by grace, that our knowledge of
God is a pure gift and not a rational or philosophical
achievement.”
Henry did believe that man was created in
the image of God, and thus endowed with a rationality that makes
thought and understanding of some truth possible. The image of
God in man includes both a rational and a moral component. Even
unregenerate men and women can distinguish between good and
evil; truth and error; right and wrong; and God and not-God.
They may not know the truth about God, but the concepts named
above are embedded in every person’s mind..
On the other hand, Henry refers often to “the noetic
effects of sin” and to “what Christian theologians call the
epistemic predicament of finite and sinful man,” that
incapacitates us from knowing truth apart from revelation.
He repeatedly refers to “the Christian demand that the
presumptions of every cultural era be tested from the standpoint
of transcendent revelation.”
Despite the Fall, which includes the mind, however, “the
nature of truth is such that the Christian revelation is
formally intelligible to all men; it convincingly overlaps
ineradicable elements of everyman’s experience, and offers a
more consistent, more comprehensive and more satisfactory
explanation of the meaning and worth of life than do other
views.”
Thus, the non-believer can understand much of what the
Christian is saying, even if he disagrees and fails to submit to
God’s truth. As a fellow creature, he can be engaged in
meaningful dialogue, even if only faith in God’s revelation
alone will bring him true comprehension.
If the non-believer has no capacity to think reasonably,
then all Christian evangelism and apologetics are useless. Henry
is merely saying that non-Christians have minds that work the
same way the Christian minds work, even though they are darkened
and ignorant.
Not understanding that “Revelation, not reason, must be the final
authority.”
Henry says, on the contrary, “Human reason
is a divinely fashioned instrument for recognizing truth; it is
not a creative source of truth.”
Why must revelation precede and control reason? Because “human
reason is not a source of infallible truth about ultimate
reality.”
Christianity depicts itself… not as a
supremely constructed metaphysical theory, but as a revelation,
differing in kind from secular philosophies grounded in rational
reflection….Its basic premise is that the living God should be
allowed to speak for himself and to define the abiding role of
reason and the meaning of revelation… the rationalistic approach
subordinates the truth of revelation to its own alternatives and
has speculated itself into exhaustion.
“Holding that revelation can be comprehended by reason alone.”
In Volume III of God,
Revelation, and
Authority,
Henry devotes an entire chapter to “The Spirit as Divine
Illuminator.”
God intends that Scripture should function
in our lives as his Spirit-illumined Word. It is the Spirit who
opens man’s being to a keen personal awareness of God’s
revelation. The Spirit empowers us to receive and appropriate
Scriptures, and promotes in us a normative theological
comprehension for a transformed life. The Spirit gives a vital
current focus to historical revelation and makes it powerfully
real.
The ministry of the Spirit of God… is as
essential and unique in enlivening God’s revelation in the lives
of his people as it is in the phenomena of divine incarnation
and divine inspiration.
The Spirit illumines Scripture, evokes
trust in God, and regenerates contrite sinners.
Henry’s approach constitutes “Greek theism.”
It is hard to know whether to laugh or to
cry at this caricature. The same charge is often leveled against
proponents of traditional Christian theism by those advocating
“openness” theology, whose own fierce attacks on Carl Henry are
thus not surprising.
Greek theism was marked by confidence in virtually
unaided human reason to understand ultimate truth, ignorance of
divine revelation, and a concept of God as impersonal.
None of these characterize the theology of Carl Henry.
Conclusion
I hope that the foregoing discussion has shown that the
charge that Carl Henry is in any sense a rationalist is totally
without foundation.
G. Wright Doyle
China Institute
civirginia@nexet.net
www.chinainst.org
Bob
E. Patterson, Carl
F. H. Henry, in Makers of the Modern Theological
Mind (Waco: Word Books, 1983), 164 f. At least one
person has charged Henry with being a Thomist. Albert
Mohler records that Thomas Reginald McNeal described
Henry’s “method as apologetic presuppositionalism” which
is “a rationalistic theological methodology dominated by
the priority of reason over faith” (“A Critical Analysis
of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F. H.
Henry” (Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 1986) 1. Mohler replies, “Yet Henry has always
stressed that revelation is
prior to both
reason and faith, even as he has championed the role of
reason and rationality in human thought…. Henry may be
rationalistic,
if by this we indicate his reliance upon reason as an
instrument of understanding; but he is not a
rationalist,
if by this he is thought to place reason prior to
revelation.” Note, 399.
The characterization of Henry as a Thomist borders on
the bizarre, given Henry’s explicit repudiation of
Aquinas’ theological method at many points. See, for
example, GRA I, 4, “The Ways of Knowing.”
Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson,
20th
Century Theology:
God & the World in a Transitional Age
(Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1992) 297.
Patterson,
Carl Henry,
166, quoting Donald Bloesch,
Essentials of Evangelical Theology II (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979) 267, 268 .
Harvie Conn, Contemporary World Theology, 2nd ed.
(Nutley, New Jersey, Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Company, 1974) 139-140, citing Cornelius Van
Til, The New Evangelicalism, unpublished paper,
n.d., 62.
C.S
Evans,
“Approaches to Christian Apologetics,” in New
Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, W.C.
Campbell-Jack and Gavin McGrath, eds. (Downers Grove:
Inter-Varsity Press: 2006) 98-99.
M.J. Ovey, “Rationalism” in W.D. Campbell-Jack and Gavin
McGrath, New
Dictionary of Christian Apologetics (Downers
Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2006) 592-594.
The quotations following come from this article.
“My
deepest memories are those spent waiting before God,
often praying for others, …sometimes waiting before him
in tears, sometimes in joy, sometimes wrestling
alternatives, sometimes just worshiping him in
adoration. Heaven will be an unending feast for the soul
that basks in his presence.” Henry,
Confessions,
407
Donald
Bloesch,
Essentials of Evangelical Theology, II, 268.
As
earlier in the paper, these criticisms are quoted from
Bob E. Paterson, Carl F. H. Henry (Waco: Word Books,
1983) 164 ff.
Roger
Olson, The Westminster
Handbook to Evangelical Theology (Louisville:
John Knox Press, 2004) 46.
Harvey M.
Conn,,
Contemporary world theology, 139. In his two
chapters on “neo-evangelicalism,” Conn makes a number of
sweeping generalizations which would seem to include
Henry in their broad rejection of that movement, but
which do not apply to Henry. Such sloppiness is both bad
scholarship and unreliable polemics, to say the least.
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