The Principia and Revelation: A
Reflection of Revelation as External and Internal*
Ryan A. Brandt
*Presented at the Southeast Meeting of the
Evangelical Philosophy Society, March 27, 2015. Used with
author's permission.*
Revelation is a central concept in
Christianity. It is indispensable to the idea of God, the
very presumption
of the biblical narrative, and the epistemological starting
point for any faithful Christian philosophy. In other
words, speaking about God in any way implies some kind of
revelation. Revelation thus stands at the center of a whole host
of Christian convictions that stem from the reality and
authority of God.
This paper shall explore general and special
revelation through the traditional philosophical delineations of
the principia cognoscendi.[i] The word,
principia (sing.
principium), is the
Latin rendering of the Hebrew
tyviare (“beginning”) or Greek,
avrch,,
(“beginning”), a term that Aristotle used to denote the
primary source, ground, or cause of all being (principia
essendi) or knowledge (principia cognoscendi). In
English, therefore, the term is best translated as
“foundations,” but it also carries a range of meaning that the
words, “foundations” and, worse yet, “principles,” cannot
maintain. For clarity’s sake, therefore, the paper will continue
to use the original,
principia, rather than translate it.
As such, the principia
cognoscendi (externum
and internum)
traditionally denote
the foundations of knowledge (whether external or internal) and
may apply to two spheres: the general sciences and
theology.[ii] The
former discusses general revelation as it bears a more natural
and universal character, whereas the latter portrays special
revelation and bears a spiritual and particular character. The
paper shall argue that both the general sciences (i.e., general
revelation) and theology (i.e., special revelation) include
external and internal dimensions. In other words, they each
include (1) an external or objective reality to be known and (2)
the internal or subjective ability to know it.[iii] The
paper shall accomplish this argument, first, by surveying the
external and internal
principia cognoscendi
of the general sciences, and, second, by exploring the
corresponding principia
of theology. The paper shall conclude by summarizing the
principia cognoscendi of
science and theology, and paralleling them to general revelation
and special revelation, respectively.
The general sciences[iv] naturally
include both a principium externum and internum
within their system. The present section shall explore the
twofold principia and then relate their epistemological
implications to general revelation.
First, the created world is the principium
cognoscendi externum.[v] Namely, there is an external
foundation of knowledge for the general sciences, a foundation
that lays outside of the human. The triune God created all
things. Jesus Christ, the Logos, for example, is before all
things, and all things continue to exist jointly through him
(John 1:3; Col 1:15-17). The created world thus reveals God and
is the basis (i.e., material source or cause) for all natural
knowledge in the general sciences. The principium is thus
the external means by which all general knowledge flows from God
to man, from the archetype to the ectype. It includes all things
that are existent in space-time, such as the physical universe,
its dimensionality, its energy, laws, and general order.
Second, the human mind or cognition is the
principium cognoscendi internum.[vi] The
external principium of creation is incomplete without a
precise way to receive, understand, and appropriate it.[vii]
Indeed, it is the selfsame triune God who created the universe (externum),
who also, through his Word and Spirit, created and sustains our
capacity and ability to understand it (internum).
Louis Berkhof asserts it well: “The same Logos that reveals the
wisdom of God in the world is also the true light” of the world,
the one which, according to the Apostle John, “gives light to
everyone” (John 1:9).[viii] It is
this Logos, through the Spirit, that is the impetus for human
understanding of all things, especially “general, necessary, and
eternal” (i.e., scientific) ideas.[ix] Humans
may think only insomuch as God sustains.
“Accordingly,” Kuyper continues, “all science is only the
application to the cosmos of powers of investigation and thought
created within us.”[x] Therefore,
corresponding to the external
principium as the
material cause, the internal
principium is the
instrumental cause of knowledge.
In the end, therefore, the principia
cognoscendi of the general sciences include external and
internal dimensions. As the Hungarian scientist and polymath,
Michael Polanyi, rightly highlights, knowing anything includes
two reciprocal poles: an (1) internal pole wherein (a) the tacit
assertion, (b) scientific hunch, (c) judgment of reality, (d)
claim of truth, and (e) striving to reach the solution are
found; and a respective (2) external pole wherein (a) the
content of that which is asserted testable by experience, (b)
validated hunch, (c) contacting reality, (d) truth itself, (e)
and reaching the solution are found.[xi] Knowledge thus includes, Polanyi
recapitulates, the “content” itself and the “personal
indwelling” of content.[xii] In this
sense, the English philosopher and psychologist, Herbert
Spencer, long ago described life as “the continuous adjustment
of internal relations to external relations.”[xiii] Indeed,
all of human life
is based upon the reciprocal relation of these elements. Where
Spencer failed to integrate the elements, Christian theology
succeeds: God created the (internal) minds of humans in such a
way that their sense perceptions and mental operations are
sufficiently adapted to the world; he also created the
(external) world so that it is stable, reliable, and orderly.[xiv] The
study of the general sciences thus must incorporate both
realities.
The principia of the general sciences
accordingly implicate one important idea for the paper:
knowledge is a continual and supernatural result of the
(revelation of the) triune God. Because creation is given by and
dependent upon God, our knowledge of creation (that is, all
things) is dependent upon God. As K. Scott Oliphint righty
deduces, “This dependence requires not just an acknowledgement
so that we can tip our theological hat to God and then go our
merry way in pursuit of truth . . . but [rather] it invites us
to see the knowledge situation as dependent” upon the whole
corpus of the triune God’s revelatory activity.[xv] Namely,
as the Father was planning and commanding, the Son was executing
and performing, and the Spirit was sustaining and increasing.[xvi] The
Spirit particularly, as he fills and animates all things, is the
epistemic means of enabling and empowering people to think,
understand, and comprehend.[xvii]
Because even the unbelieving scientist is Spirit-gifted to
recognize—each according to that given him—various features of
the world, therefore, it is logical that science includes a
twofold principia, one
which in fact parallels our heretofore argued understanding of
revelation. Just as revelation contains an external general
principia in creation, so also do the general sciences; as
revelation contains an internal general
principia in human
reason, so also do the sciences.[xviii]
Knowledge is the result of the proper correlating of the
external (creation) and the internal (mind) so that the two
correspond.[xix]
Theology also logically includes both a
principium externum and internum within its system or
prolegomena. These shall be explored in order; then the chapter
shall draw out implications of the
principia for theology
and the general sciences.
First, the principium externum of
theology is Holy Scripture itself. Theology needs this external
principium because, within creation itself, the infinite
and transcendent God must necessarily remain inaccessible to
finite and (more importantly) sinful creatures. The purpose or
function of the principium
is obvious: to describe, assess, and evaluate God and the world
correctly. As Calvin
recognizes, “[I]t appears that if men were taught only by
nature, then they would hold to nothing certain or solid or
clear-cut, but would be so tied to confused principles as to
worship an unknown God.”[xx]
Namely, while God consistently reveals himself in the
creation, the noetic devastation of the fall left that
disclosure misunderstood and misappropriated. In order to
complete his plan of revelation—to ensure true and proper
knowledge of himself—, therefore, God continued to reveal
himself through the words of prophets and, eventually, through
their writings in Scripture. As the primary source and material
cause of science is creation itself, so also the primary source
and material cause of theology is Scripture.[xxi]
The principium internum of theology,
second, is the regeneration of the Spirit that leads to faith
and the illumination of the Spirit that leads to true perception
of Scripture.[xxii]
Theology needs this internal principle because, on account of
active and destructive sin, humans are not receptive to the
gospel—and the whole of theology—until they are unveiled by the
Spirit. For, while Scripture is misunderstood and misrepresented
by unbelieving eyes, it was required for God to open these eyes
to believe. Irenaeus compares such divine grace to the dew and
the rain, both of which make the fields fruitful.[xxiii]
Augustine summarizes, “Unless you have believed, you will not
understand.”[xxiv]
Therefore, writes Berkhof, this internal principium
“brings the knowledge of God into man, which is after all the
aim of all theology and of the whole self-revelation of God.”[xxv] Just as
human rationality (created and sustained by the Spirit) is that
which apprehends the external world; so also the Spirit’s
illumination unto faith leads to the correct apprehension of the
Scripture (and the world); just as human reason is impaired and
maimed by sin, therefore, the Holy Spirit is the internal
principium that restores and illumines rationality. Alister
McGrath says it well: “The task of the Holy Spirit is to lead
into God’s truth; without the Spirit, truth remains elusive.”[xxvi]
Accordingly, the principia cognoscendi
of theology implicate two important realities for this paper.
First, while the unbelieving person can know many things about
the world, only the believer may apprehend those Spirit-given
realities. On the one hand, many of the greatest
geniuses—whether Plato, Mozart, or Einstein—were, by all
indications, without the Spirit-guided reading of Scripture; yet
they manufactured, respectively, some of the greatest
philosophical edifices, the most beautiful and elegant
symphonies, and the most synthesized and creative scientific
hypotheses. However, because of sin and the corresponding
absence and distortion of the principia of theology
(i.e., Word and Spirit), they were left blind to other,
unperceived spiritual realities.
The believer, on the other hand, may apprehend
those realities that only the Spirit can impart. This work of
the Spirit does not add new information beyond Scripture or the
natural world; it also does not change humanity’s sense
perception or reason; and, furthermore, it is not a platonic
upward movement of surreal contemplation.[xxvii]
Rather, the action rectifies or resurrects human cognition.
Namely, following Kuyper, Geerhardus Vos contends, “Redemption
[via regeneration] in a supernatural way restores to fallen man
also the normalcy and efficiency of his cognition of God in the
sphere of nature.”[xxviii] To
put it simply, the epistemic problems are sin and rebellion from
God; the epistemic solutions are renewing the person
(regeneration) and enlightening the mind (illumination).[xxix] This
organic work of the Spirit obviously applies to the biblical
text, where, as Kevin Vanhoozer suggests, the Spirit (1)
convicts us that the Bible is divinely authoritative, (2)
impresses its truth onto our minds, and (3) sanctifies us so
that we truly read the text instead of preferring our own
interpretations.[xxx] The epistemic spiritual work
also applies to general revelation in creation, for it is a
divine work wherein the Spirit privately enables ordinary
cognition so that believers can think in terms of God as they
gaze at the world.[xxxi] In
other words, the existence of the principia cognoscendi
of theology implicate that regenerated people perceive Scripture
and the world differently.
In this sense, second, the theological
principia result in a person’s shift in worldview. While it
is true that the believing and unbelieving person evidently see
the same things as they gaze upon the cosmos, the difference
herein is not material but rather formal. Namely, as believers
are affected by special revelation (by Word and Spirit), they
perceive the world in a different way.[xxxii] The difference, as Esther L.
Meek asserts, is that the believer has the formal Spirit-given
instructions for viewing the world: just as a person must
acquire and trust the directions to Magic Eye 3-D pictures to
open up the reality of the particulars (her example), so also
the believer possesses and trusts God’s instructions about the
world to unlock the reality of the world.[xxxiii]
Following Meek’s mentor, Michael Polanyi, one might say that,
just as knowledge in the general sciences requires “indwelling”
the particulars of the subsidiary awareness to experience
knowledge, so also knowledge in theology—and all
subjects—ultimately requires the Holy Spirit’s epistemic
“indwelling” to illuminate the mind’s perception.[xxxiv] With
practice, as John Macquarrie explains, this person perceives “an
extra dimension” in a situation, so that he or she knows what
God is doing.[xxxv] For
example, while an unbeliever may accurately perceive a cedar
branch blowing in the wind, only the believer (through the
twofold principia) is able to apprehend that, in this
case among others, God “creates the wind” that moves the branch
(Amos 4:13). This idea explains why John Calvin urges his
readers to learn to see every feature of creation as God’s
clothes, for the features of the world move only insomuch as he
acts.[xxxvi]
Alvin Plantinga summarizes the discussion
well: because the Spirit’s internal instigation resurrects our
fallen noetic capacities, the believer may perceive God in
creation and thereby conclude that God created and sustains the
world (among other gospel realities).[xxxvii] The
theological principia, therefore, provide believers with
a new paradigm for the person of God and the nature of life so
that believers are enabled to think and live differently. The
principia result in a worldview shift.
This paper heretofore has correlated
revelation with the principia cognoscendi of the sciences
(i.e., general revelation) and theology (i.e., special
revelation), and thus it argued that divine revelation or the
principia ought to be
expressed in its external and internal dimensions (see Figure
2).[xxxviii]
Figure 1
The Principia within their Spheres
|
|
Spheres
|
General Sciences
|
Theology
|
Principia
|
External
|
Creation
|
Holy Scripture
|
Internal
|
Mind
|
Holy Spirit/Faith
|
On the one hand, the principia cognoscendi
of science include external creation and the internal mind.
These twofold principia are generalized and available to
all people—to more or less degrees. Unbelievers do not share
regeneration (and thus faith) as the internal
principium, but they
do have cognition. As the paper has also asserted, it is helpful
to view both of these, creation and mind, as derivative of the
Holy Spirit, lest one forgets that both are supernaturally given
and governed.
On the other hand, the theological
principia basically reduce to Scripture and illumination. By these
principia, the person is enlightened, able to apprehend
salvific knowledge, and thereby perceive the spiritual
connections between such knowledge. In other words, after the
internal principium of the Spirit regenerates and
illumines, people perceive and accept the gospel (which they
heretofore rejected) and thus understand and apply those gospel
realities to the world around them. This new insight does not
include more information than is disclosed in Scripture or the
natural world; rather, the action rectifies or resurrects human
cognition.
In summation, both science and theology
include a principium cognoscenti externum and a
principium cognoscenti internum, the former of which refers
to the material cause and the latter of which corresponds to the
instrumental cause of the subject. These two principia,
forever united, Word and Spirit, are the basis of science and
theology and the means of understanding the full doctrine of
revelation. The Word basically corresponds to the external
principium, because it is the objective source or material
cause of knowledge in science (creation) and theology
(Scripture). The Spirit corresponds to the internal
principium, for it is the subjective source or instrumental
cause of knowledge in science (reason) and theology
(illumination). In other words, following the articulations of
Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, the eminent Roman Catholic
theologian, René Latourelle, summarizes, “There is the combined
activity of the external announcing and the interior
attraction.”[xxxix]
Accordingly, Kuyper’s conclusion regarding the necessity of both
dimensions in the principia is pertinent:
From the finite no conclusion can be drawn to the infinite, neither can a
Divine reality be known from external or internal phenomena,
unless that God reveals Himself in my consciousness to my ego;
reveals Himself as God; and thereby moves and impels me to see
in these finite phenomena a brightness of His glory.[xl]
The former discussions left unaided may lead
to the wrong impression that the two coterminous dimensions of
revelation/principia (cognoscendi)
are unrelated or otherwise detached from one another. Nothing
could be farther from the case. While the former section
elaborated the epistemological substructures (principia
cognoscendi)
of revelation, it remains to discuss the ontological groundwork,
that is, the
principium essendi.
This section will argue that the triune God is the
principium essendi
and likewise holds the two
principia cognoscendi
together in his one organic act of revelation.
The
principium essendi is the fundamental source, ground, or
cause from which being, existence, and knowledge proceeds. The
principium thus refers
to the triune God himself, the fountain of all things.[xli]
Therefore, as Francis Turretin reminds his readers, “The
question properly is not of principles (principiis),
but of things principiated (principiatis).”[xlii]
In other words, the purpose of the
principia is not to
abstract knowledge or revelation down to its most fundamental
components (i.e., external or internal); rather, the purpose is
to “set your mind on things above,” that is, God in Christ, “in
whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col
3:2, 2:3). Indeed, it is God who principiates (i.e., makes
foundational) the rest of knowledge through his being and works.
And thus, it is God who is the
principium essendi.
As the
principium essendi, the triune God speaks in one, united
communicative act. God is Trinity and, in some sense, he is also
Speaker, Speech, and its Spokenness.[xliii]
Borrowing terminology from Speech Act Theory, God is likewise
Locution, Illocution, and Perlocution.[xliv] He
speaks a locution (by the Father), and his speech carries an
objective, concrete meaning or illocution (by the Son as Logos),
and this speech is ultimately and effectively received and
appropriated as a perlocution (by the Spirit). In the same way
that one cannot separate the intended meaning of a statement
(illocution) from its intended result (perlocution), one cannot
abstract the principium
cognoscendi externum of the Word from the corresponding
principium cognoscendi internum of the Spirit. The twofold
principia
cognoscendi consists of two sides to the one coin of the
principium essendi.
This idea accounts for why Irenaeus distinguishes the triune
communicative act as God’s singular accomplishment by his two
personified hands, the Word and Spirit.[xlv] It also
accounts for why numerous theologians assert that revelation
includes both components. The triune God organically unites his
revelation. Just as there is one triune God, so also there is
one triune communicative act.
Therefore, linking this discussion back to a theology of revelation,
one can say that revelation, as its source is within God (essendi),
corresponds to both the principium cognoscendi externum
and the principium cognoscendi internum. On the one hand,
the principium cognoscendi externum is the external
speaking itself. God speaks locutions, and by these locutions,
he intends the illocutionary force. These truly and properly
reveal God in the external sense (e.g., Scripture and creation).
On the other hand, the principium cognoscendi internum is
the internal appropriation. Language has not yet fulfilled its
intention until the listener actually internally hears and
responds to the external word. This result occurs through the
Word’s perlocutionary power, which is the Holy Spirit and its
corresponding human result in faith. The external-internal
distinction thus helps to incorporate both dimensions of
revelation. As Vanhoozer writes, “The Son is the form and
content of the divine discourse, the Spirit its energy and
persuasive efficacy.”[xlvi] Revelation likewise may be
understood as the external act of God’s self-disclosure and the
internal perception that actually results from such divine
action. Both are inexorably tied and cannot be separated. The
Word without the Spirit is empty; the Spirit without the Word is
blind.
When both poles of revelation are present,
revelation is a powerful force. As the author of Hebrews
assures, “For the word of God is living and active, sharper than
any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of
spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and
intentions of the heart” (Heb 4:12). The Scriptures alone do not
accomplish this robust result, as if mere words salvifically
reveal to sinful human hearts apart from the illumination of the
Spirit. As John Webster perceptively observes, “Reading
Scripture is inescapably bound to regeneration.”[xlvii]
Nor, however, does the Spirit affect this result apart from the
Bible. Rather, revelation is external words with internal
import. Revelation may be compared to an illumined sentence from
which we move forward and backward to attain a better
understanding of the whole.[xlviii]
Extending the metaphor, revelation includes a revealed meaning
(locution) through its intended (illocutionary) force that then
affects the feelings, thoughts, and actions (perlocutions) of
the speaker/listener. Namely, it is when the external revelation
(i.e., the Bible) is read and the internal revelation (i.e., the
Spirit) regenerates and illumines the reader’s mind and heart—or
understanding and will—that the reader can say that the Bible is
not a mere book and that the Spirit is in him or her. It is at
this point that revelation fully and finally does its job in
bringing the Word of God “out there” (external) to the Word of
God “in here” (internal).[xlix]
This consequence is, in fact, merely an implication of a truly
Reformed theology.
In this sense, revelation is multidimensional.
It is an organic act of God whereby he personally confronts the
whole individual—his or her mind, heart, and will. Revelation is
internal and external communication. It entails communication of
propositional truth via the revelations of Christ, the Bible,
and creation, so that revelation indeed includes an external
component. It also entails an internal component, where Christ
encounters the individual by the Spirit. As John Webster again
summarizes, “Revelation is thus not simply the bridging of a
noetic divide (though it includes that), but is reconciliation,
salvation, and therefore fellowship.”[l] Because
revelation has both an external and internal component, it can
be articulated in words and propositions but it is also a
redeeming experience of divine encounter.[li] Revelation therefore manifests
itself through God’s Word—creation and Scripture—and by his
Spirit—in regeneration and illumination. It thus encompasses all
the self-presentation and self-communication of the triune God
to humans, both externally and internally, from creation through
redemption unto eternity.
[i]While
it may be objected that the terminology of principia
is outdated and/or modern, this kind of objection does
not stand. The conception of the principia, whether
explicitly or implicitly, is at the basis of any subject
of study. In doing theology, for example, the Christian
person is forced to make a decision to begin with
revelation (cognoscendi) or God (essendi);
likewise, he or she must choose to begin either with the
work of Christ (cognoscendi)
or the person of Christ (essendi)
in their Christologies. The person is required, in other
words, to make decisions concerning ultimate principles
or foundations of his or her own theological or
philosophical systems. Naturally, a person must
undergird his thought before he elaborates, lest his
argument be open to objections. This is the purpose of
the principia.
It simply refers to the foundation of being (principia
essendi), that is, God; or the foundation of
knowledge (principia cognoscendi), that is,
revelation. Whatever terms one uses to argue this point
does not matter. The fact is that these arguments are
necessary, whether one is a coherentist, (modified)
foundationalist, or pragmatist; whether one is a
rationalist, empiricist, or realist.
[ii]For
discussions of the definition of principia, see
Aristotle,
Metaphysics,
trans. E. W. Webster et al., in vol. 8 of
Great Books of the
Western World, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago:
William Benton, 1952), Book I; for a more theological
description, see Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics,
1:207-208; or Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:93.
The nature of the
principia in
relation to Christian theology is aptly summarized by
Muller: “When the question of principia is considered
casually, we again raise the question of an essential or
external foundation since theology obviously is not
self-caused. In addition to this external ground, all
disciplines also have their own inward or internal
basis, a principium belonging to that discipline itself”
(Muller, PRRD, 1:440; see 440ff.). For the development of the
principia in
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, see
Muller, PRRD, 1:90-92; 437-440; for the Reformed background, see Ibid.,
121-132, cf. 29, 39, where Muller attributes to Charles
Hodge, Louis Berkhof, and others an orthodox or
classical variety of the Reformed
principia. As
Muller concludes, the
principia—and
the prolegomena, of which the
principia are
part—“arguably provides the best point of entry into the
theology of the late sixteenth and seventeeth centuries”
(Ibid., 43). The terminology of
principia, while most explicitly used within the Reformation and
Post-Reformation eras, thus have strong precursors in
the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, along
with the theology of Augustine and Bonaventure. While
the external/internal distinction within the
principia and revelation is a classically Reformed distinction,
other traditions use the
principia in
complementary ways. For a Roman Catholic perspective on
these issues, and on issues of foundations and
prolegomena in theology in general, see Thomas G.
Guarino,
Foundations of Systematic Theology: Theology for the
Twenty-First Century (New York: T & T Clark, 2005).
In fact, René Latourelle rightly argues that the
Catholic tradition in fact supports the external and
internal distinction in revelation (Latourelle,
Theology of Revelation, 377-387). For an Anglican
perspective of the principia of theology through
the lens of the Thirty-Nine Articles, see W. H. Griffith
Thomas, The
Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the
Thirty-Nine Articles (New York: Longmans, Green, and
Company, 1930). For a Lutheran perspective, see Carl E.
Braaten,
Principles of Lutheran Theology (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1983) or Heinrich Schmid,
The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 3rd
ed., trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1899). For a natural theology
perspective on the principia, see George Hayward Joyce,
Principles of
Natural Theology, 3rd ed. (New York:
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1934).
The principia can also refer to more narrow realities; for example, they
can refer to the specific principia of Christian
theology as inspired Scripture (principia theologiae
specialis), or they may denote mathematical
principles undergirding reality (i.e., principia
mathematica). For the former, see Kuyper,
Principles of Sacred Theology, 355-356, cf. 341-563
(who also can speak of the principia in terms of
general and special [cf. 348-405]). For the latter, see
John Craige, a friend of Isaac Newton, in John Craige,
Theologiae
Christianae Principia Mathematica (London: House,
1699); cf. Richard Nash,
John Craige’s
Mathematical Principles of Christian Theology
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991).
As Turretin asserts in the Reformed context, “The
principle [of theology] is both external (the word of
God which embraces the law and the gospel—the former
setting forth the things to be done, the latter those to
be known and believed, hence called the ‘mystery of
godliness’ and ‘the word of life’) and internal (the
Spirit who is a Spirit of truth and sanctification, of
knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, Is. 11:2)”
(Francis Turretin,
Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. George
Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., 3 vols.
[Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1992], 1:7.6). (Turretin
asserts this twofold truth in the context of
establishing that theology is both theoretical and
practical, or rather, “theoretico-practical” [cf. Ibid.,
1:7.1-15].) Muller also explains that, by the two
principia of theology, external and internal, Turretin means that
there are two “foundations,” for “theology obviously is
not self-caused” (Muller,
PRRD, 1:440,
cf. 430-450; cf. 2:202-205).
[iii]While
not the inspiration for this dissertation, Louis Berkhof
argues similarly that, just as theology contains a
principium cognoscendi externum and internum,
so also do the “non-theological sciences,” namely
philosophy (i.e., epistemology) (cf. Berkhof,
Systematic Theology, 1:93-97).
[iv]The
term, “general sciences,” here intends to include all
the physical or natural sciences (e.g., physics,
chemistry, biology, etc.), the social sciences (e.g.,
anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.), as well as
the formal sciences (e.g., mathematics, logic,
philosophy, etc.). In other words, the term is meant to
encompass any study of natural, social, human, or mental
reality. As he develops his Principles, Kuyper
likewise uses the term to denote both the “hard
sciences” as well as the “soft sciences” (Kuyper,
Principles of Sacred Theology, 122).
[v]“God’s
beautiful creation, replete with divine wisdom, is the
principium cognoscendi externum of all
non-theological sciences” (Berkhof,
Systematic
Theology, 1:94).
[vi]Namely,
if the special internal principles is the illumined
mind, then the general internal principle is the
unilluminated mind itself, that is, the mind of the
natural person. While one should also include the human
conscience as the internal correlate (following the
biblical data before), the mind is the more generalized
form. Namely, while the mind is the (material) source of
human cognition, the conscience is the source of
morality, a source that no doubt finds its greater
foundation within the human mind. Indeed, theologians
have long attested that the mind of the human is a
revelation of God, for it is the highest material
expression of rationality in the universe. This is why
John Calvin correlated the internal sensus
divinitatis (“sense of divinity”) with an innate and
general preconception of divine knowledge in all human
persons (he writes, “There is within the human mind, and
indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity.
This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone
from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God
himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding
of his divine majesty” [Calvin, Institutes,
1:3.1; cf. 1:3.2-3; Edward Adams, “Calvin’s View of
Natural Knowledge of God,”
IJST 3 [2001]:
280-292). This is also why Augustine, in large measure,
found the highest revelation of God as triune within his
consciousness or mind, playing with themes such as
intellect, memory, knowledge, and love to display the
reality of the Trinity (Augustine,
On The Holy Trinity,
trans. Arthur West Haddan, in vol. 3 of
A Select Library
of the
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
ed. Philip Schaff [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983], books
9-12). Indeed, it would be odd to understand anything
other than the mind as being the internal receptacle of
revelation, for it is person’s cognition that, among
other things, is restored so that they believe
(regeneration) and know (illumination) spiritual
realities.
[vii]As
Kuyper and Hodge have rightly noted,
knowledge in
the general sciences thus includes a threefold relation:
the subject of science (the scientist and his/her
cognitive capacity), the object of science (the
universe), and the law(s) governing science (the
scientific laws). See Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 257; cf.
Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:9-10. In other
words, revelation and knowledge both include the
subject, object, and subject-object relation within
their definitions (cf. Harriet A. Harris, “A Diamond in
the Dark,” in Religion, Pluralism, and Public Life:
Abraham Kuyper’s Legacy for the Twenty-First Century,
ed. Luis E. Lugo [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 128).
[viii]Berkhof,
Systematic
Theology, 1:95. For Kuyper’s explanation of the
relationship between the natural world and
consciousness, see Kuyper, Principles of Sacred
Theology, 355-368. God’s epistemic work here is
Trinitarian. In the same way that the Logos enables all
knowledge, so also the Spirit is the source and agent of
all life in humanity and the world (cf. Gen 1:2; Ps
33:6; 104:30; 139:7; Job 26:13; 33:4), especially the
intellectual, ethical, and spiritual life (Job 32:8; Isa
11:2).
[ix]Berkhof,
Systematic
Theology, 1:95. Justin Martyr is one of the earliest
theologians to argue this idea (see his
Second Apology,
Dialogue with
Trypho, a Jew, and the
Discourse to the
Greeks, in ANF, ed. Alexander Roberts and James
Donaldson, vol. 1 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956],
188-272). However, he had a tendency to abstract an
unbeliever’s knowledge (through the Logos) from the
salvific implications of the Logos. As such, his
theology tended to be too optimistic about people’s
knowledge of even spiritual matters. (See especially his
comments paralleling Moses and Plato [idem,
First Apology,
182].) The Dutch Reformed tradition, while rightly
returning to foundation of knowledge in the Christ as
Logos, also correctly distinguished the “sphere
sovereignty” of natural knowledge and saving knowledge
(Berkhof,
Systematic Theology, 1:95; cf. Kuyper, Lectures
on Calvinism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953], 112).
[x]Kuyper,
Lectures on Calvinism, 92; cf. idem,
Principles of Sacred Theology, 83, 92.
[xi]Michael
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), esp. 15, 17, 48, 69-131; cf. Stefania Ruzsits
Jha, Reconsidering Michael Polanyi’s Philosophy
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 68,
cf. 51-69; Jerry H. Gill, The Tacit Mode: Michael
Polanyi’s Postmodern Philosophy (Albany, NY: State
University of New York, 2000), 51-55. Stefania Ruzsits
Jha also argues for a neo-Polanyian development wherein
active empathy (humane passion) and heuristic striving
(intellectual passion) are added to the internal pole of
knowing (Jha, Reconsidering Michael Polanyi’s
Philosophy, 202). For a shorter summary, see idem,
The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1966). Polanyi’s work has even been correlated with John
Calvin and Albert Einstein (see Iain Paul,
Knowledge of God: Calvin, Einstein, and Polanyi (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic, 1987).
[xii]Michael
Polanyi, Knowledge and Being, ed. Marjorie Grene
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 148.
Indwelling describes an innate epistemic process
whereby, as we direct our attention on a focal object by
way of our subsidiary awareness, we interioriorize and
integrate the object and thereby perceive the greater
dimension. For the most direct explanation of
indwelling, see Andrew T. Grosso, Personal Being:
Polanyi, Ontology, and Christian Theology (New York:
Peter Lang, 2007), 24-27. Jerry Gill admirably
summarizes Polanyi: “[Polanyi’s model] construes reality
as structured according to a hierarchy of dimensions
that interpenetrate and mediate one another in a
vectorial pattern by means of boundary conditions and
rules. The richer, more comprehensive dimensions are
mediated in and through the lesser, without being
explainable in terms of them” (Gill, The Tacit Mode,
37). Gill thus explains epistemic indwelling: it is “the
process of immersing oneself in the particulars of
subsidiary awareness by means of embodied activity until
these particulars come together as a meaningful whole in
an ‘integrative act’” (Ibid., 52). Indeed, one cannot
recognize a mood on a person’s face or a species of rock
simply through an explanation of external variables.
This fact, he explains, is proof that knowing is
external as well as internal (Michael Polanyi, “The
Logic of Tacit Inference,” in Knowing and Being:
Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene
[London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969], 156).
[xiii]Herbert
Spencer,
Principles of Psychology (London: Longman, Brown,
Green, and Longmans, 1855), §120.
[xiv]In
other words, the unbelieving person can understand many
things from creation. The atomic physicist can know,
understand, and assess an atom’s behavior (in relation
to mass, acceleration, and velocity), properties (its
quark components, various spins and charges), and cosmic
history (where and when that atom was at t1,
t2, and so on). The artist can glimpse Albert
Bierstadt’s sublime landscapes or Louis Le Vau’s
majestic architecture and perceive the inherent symmetry
and beauty. The stoic cosmologist can gaze upon the
exceeding grandeur, harmony, and improbability of the
universe and postulate a divine, rational principle that
transcends it. In other words, and perhaps obviously,
the natural person can see the world on its own terms.
[xv]K.
Scott Oliphint,
God with Us: Divine Condescension and the Attributes of
God (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012),
130. Oliphint specifically implicates that knowledge is
dependent upon “God” himself; this author simply added
“the triune God” to his remarks.
[xvi]This
language alludes to Irenaeus’s Trinitarian structure
(Irenaeus, Against Heresies, in Ante-Nicene
Fathers, vol. 1, trans. Alexander Roberts and
William Rambaut, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson,
and A. Cleveland Coxe [Buffalo: Christian Literature,
1885 [On-line], accessed 20 September 2010, available
from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm;
Internet, ed. Kevin Knight, 2:30.9; 3:24.2; 4:20.1;
4:38.3). For an excellent discussion that places the
essence and function of truth within the larger domain
of the triune God, see Bruce D. Marshall, Trinity and
Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[xvii]As
Calvin writes, God “fills, moves, and quickens all
things by the power of the same Spirit, and does so
according to the character that he bestowed upon each
kind by the law of creation” (Calvin,
Institutes,
2:2.16). Calvin argues that even the “natural
capacities” of man are in fact supernatural. He calls
this “the seed of the knowledge of God” (Ibid., 1:5.15).
Or, he calls it “some sort of divinity,” a “seed” that
cannot be “uprooted” (Ibid., 1:4.4). As he continues,
however, “this seed is so corrupted that by itself it
produces only the worst fruits” (Ibid.). Therefore,
while all people have access to the data of the created
world, and many even have Scripture itself; every person
knows something only as the Holy Spirit allows it. As
Calvin often and incessantly (though not exclusively)
speaks positively and vividly of the “admirable light of
truth shining in secular writers:” he writes, “Those men
whom Scripture calls ‘natural men’ were, indeed, sharp
and penetrating in their investigation of inferior
things. Let us, accordingly, learn by their example how
many gifts the Lord left to human nature even after it
was despoiled of its true good” (Ibid., 2:2.15). Because
God bestowed so many gifts upon human nature, therefore,
the whole enquiry of human study—even “by the work and
ministry of the ungodly”—are gratifying and essential.
So much so, that “if we neglect God’s gift freely
offered in these arts, we ought to suffer just
punishment for our sloths” (Ibid., 2:2.16, cf. 2:2.15).
As heretofore mentioned, Bavinck also speaks of all
knowledge of “nature and history” that we apply in
business, commerce, industry, arts, and sciences as a
result of the revelation of God: “For all these elements
of culture exist only because God has implanted in his
creation thoughts and forces that human beings gradually
learn to understand under his guidance” (Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:341).
In this sense, all knowledge and revelation is
supernatural. Bavinck argues this idea cogently (see
idem, Reformed
Dogmatics, 1:307-312). Abraham Kuyper rightly
asserts that, even though sin powerfully distorts the
human person and mind, God, through his general grace,
allows us to understand the world in large measure. He
contends that God’s “[r]evelation . . . does not cease
with sin; nothing can annihilate the omnipresence of
God, not even sin; nor can man’s dependence as image
upon the archetype be destroyed, neither can the
mystical contact of the infinite and the finite in the
human soul be abolished” (Kuyper, Principles of
Sacred Theology, 276). There is, in fact, no
supernatural/natural distinction within knowledge or
revelation (Ibid., 1:355-361). And yet, this distinction
remains alive among some Christian theologians today
(see, for example, Alister McGrath, who distinguishes
between the knowledge of God that is “naturally”
available and only “revealed” [cf. Alister E. McGrath,
Christian Theology: An Introduction, 4th
ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 153-172]). Given the
framework argued in this thesis, it is difficult to
establish some knowledge of God that is purely “natural”
and other knowledge that is “revealed.” The distinction
breaks down when one considers, as Calvin and Bavinck
argue, that all knowledge, no matter what the content,
is ultimately supernatural as it is derived and enabled
by God.
[xviii]Bavinck
concludes, “But if that is the case, if in virtue of its
nature religion has its own external principle of
knowledge (principium
cognoscendi externum), then there also has to
correspond to it a unique internal principle of
knowledge (principium
cognoscendi internum). Just as the eye answers to
light, the ear to sound, the logos (reason) within us to
the logos (rationality) outside of us, so there has to
be in human beings a subjective organ that answers to
the objective revelation of God” (Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics,
1:505). He continues, “Eventually, all philosophers of
religion are finally and willy-nilly brought to the
recognition that human beings are by nature religious
beings, that they are akin to God, and his image”
(Ibid.; cf. Ibid., 1:233). See also Ibid., 207-233,
501-507; Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology,
67, 260.
[xix]In
this context, it may be helpful to note the parallel
between knowledge and revelation. Indeed, science and
theology—or rather, knowledge and revelation—are closely
associated and contemporaneous in the Christian
worldview. Anything classified as knowledge in any
subject of study is a by-product of God’s own
self-revelation—whether explicitly known or not, whether
general or special, whether external or internal.
Namely, as the dissertation has asserted, just as God
has created the world (and all that is in it), so also
creation (and all that is in it) reveals God. “Thus the
whole world is an embodiment of the thoughts of God” (Berkhof,
Systematic Theology, 1:94; cf. Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics,
1:301-322). In short, there is no knowledge without
God’s revelation. “God conveyed this knowledge to man by
employing the Logos, the Word, as the agent of creation”
(Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:94). Therefore,
Berkhof continues, “Instead of ‘the world as God’s
creation’ we might also say ‘God’s revelation in nature”
(Ibid.). The logic necessarily follows: knowledge and
revelation are not mutually opposed, but rather (all)
knowledge itself is based upon revelation. One can know
a scientific truth only insomuch as he or she bases such
an observation or theory upon God’s self-revelation,
specifically, the revelation of God in his creation (his
laws, order, governance, and harmony).
Indeed, just as revelation assumes three
aspects—one who reveals himself, the one to whom he
reveals himself, and the possibility and actuality of
the relation between these two—so also science contains
three elements—the subject of science (the scientist),
the object of science (the universe), and the law(s)
governing science (the scientific laws) (Kuyper,
Principles of Sacred Theology, 257; cf. Hodge,
Systematic Theology, 1:9-10). As the question of
revelation (as external and internal) raises the
question of knowledge, therefore, so also it forces us
to speak of knowledge as external and internal. To say
it simply: because revelation and knowledge are two
siblings in one family under the organic unity of God,
just as revelation must consider the external and
internal components, so also must knowledge. An
insightful commentary on this point is made by John
Macquarrie, who argues that revelation necessarily
expresses itself in “calculative” thinking (following
Heidegger) as well as “existential” thinking (probably
following Barth), so that, just as revelation contains
two dimensions, so knowledge must also (John Macquarrie,
Principles of Christian Theology, 2nd ed. [New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977], 90-96). Given the
different assumptions of Macquarrie, of course, he
implicates something beyond the argument of this
dissertation.
[xx]Calvin,
Institutes,
1:5.12.
[xxi]While
overstated, Bonaventure is helpful: “Thus, theology is
the only perfect science, for it begins at the very
beginning, which is the First Principle [God], and
continues to the very end, which is the everlasting
reward; it proceeds from the summit, which is God Most
High, the Creator of all things, and reaches even to the
abyss, which is the torment of hell” (Bonaventure,
Breviloquium,
trans. and ed. Dominic V. Monti, vol. 9, Works of St.
Bonaventure [Saint Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute
Publications, 2005], 28). In other words, as he
parallels science and theology, Bonaventure suggests
that theology is the only complete science as it
contains the correct perception of the world and the
gospel itself.
[xxii]One
could connect the internal
principium cognoscendi to the regenerating and illuminating work of
the Spirit, on the one hand, or its human result, faith,
on the other (for the former, see Bavinck, Reformed
Dogmatics, 1:207; for the latter, see Rom 10:17; Gal
3:3, 5; Heb 11:1, 3; cf. Berkhof, Systematic Theology,
1:97). This inward principle may also be biblically
identified as spiritual rebirth (John 3:3, 5), purity of
heart (Matt 5:8), doing the will of God (John 7:17), or
the anointing of the Spirit (1 John 2:20). The question
is simply a matter of terminology and emphasis.
Nevertheless, for the sake of perceiving the unity of
the Triune God in all his activity, this chapter will
consider the work of the Holy Spirit the internal
dimension.
[xxiii]Irenaeus,
Against Heresies, in vol. 1 of ANF (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 3:17.2.3.
Augustine,
On The Holy Trinity,
trans. Arthur West Haddan, in vol. 3 of
A Select Library
of the
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 15.2; cf. idem,
Confessions of
Saint Augustine,
trans. Edward B. Pusey, in vol. 1 of
A Select Library
of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian
Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 13.1. He
previously defines faith simply: “what is believing
unless it is to agree to that which is said is true”
(idem, On the Trinity, 13.1).
[xxv]Berkhof,
Systematic Theology, 1:97.
[xxvi]McGrath,
Christian Theology, 241.
[xxvii]For
the latter, see Plato: as he suggests, the person “has
the ability to uplift the best part of the soul toward
the contemplation of the best in things that are in the
real world.” Plato’s words here apply to his conception
of recollection (anamnesis) or the dialectic (cf.
Plato, Republic, in vol. 6 of Plato,
trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, LCL
[Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2013], 532C-D, cf. 531D-534D). For a modern proponent of
religious contemplation towards knowledge, see John
Hick, Who or What
is God?: And Other Investigations (New York:
Seabury, 2009), esp. 14-30.
[xxviii]Vos,
Biblical Theology, 20, cf. 69. As he helpfully
suggests, the Spirit’s internal redemption does not only
affect our perception of general revelation, but also
special revelation (Ibid., 20-22). For example, as
Kuyper argues, regeneration (or, as he prefers,
palingenesis) restrains the noetic effects of sin
and produces the newfound ability to see the universe as
it really is (i.e., illumination) (Kuyper, Principles
of Sacred Theology, 299). He writes, “Here we affirm
that in every domain palingenesis revivifies the
original man as ‘a creature of God,’ and for no single
moment abandons what was given in the nature of man”
(Ibid.). In other words, the Holy Spirit, “by
illumination, enables the human consciousness to take up
into itself the substance of the Scriptures,” leads us
to “ever richer insights into its content,” and imparts
“personal application of the Word” that is “intended and
indispensable for them” (Ibid., 402). Following Kuyper’s
basic trajectory, Geerhardus Vos likewise argues, “The
main correction, however, of the natural knowledge of
God cannot come from within nature itself: it must be
supplied by the supernaturalism of redemption” (Vos,
Biblical Theology, 20). For an excellent discussion
of this idea, see Schumacher,
Divine Illumination, 62-64. For further discussion of the work of
the Spirit in relationship to hermeneutics, see David
Chang-Nyon Kim, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in the
Interpretation of the Word of God” (Ph.D. diss.,
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012). For a
Roman Catholic appraisal of regeneration (i.e.,
justification=regeneration) that drives towards
epistemological implications of the doctrine, see
Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and
the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 162-169.
[xxix]As
Kuyper contends, the problem is twofold: namely, a
formal one whereby the disorder of the sinner must be
neutralized, and a material one, where the knowledge of
God must be extended to include the knowledge of God’s
relation to the (now) sinner (Kuyper, Principles of
Sacred Theology, 275). This problem is augmented by
palingenesis (or regeneration) and illumination,
on the one hand, and special revelation, on the other.
For the former, see Ibid., 150ff., 280-281, 288-289,
298, 327, 345, 361, 402, 415, 508, 554; for the latter,
see Ibid., 275, 327, 361. This is why Dirk van Keulen
argues that Kuyper’s theological epistemology consists
of three aspects: special revelation, regeneration, and
illumination (cf. Dirk van Keulen, “The Internal Tension
in Kuyper’s Doctrine of Organic Inspiration of
Scripture,” in Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of his
Life and Work, ed. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de
Bruijn [Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999], 124).
[xxx]Kevin
Vanhoozer, Is
there Meaning in this Text? (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1998), 413-414; idem,
First Theology:
God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2002),
233-234. See also the previous discussion in this
chapter (“Internal Reality of Revelation”).
[xxxi]As
D. A. Carson asserts, “What the Spirit accomplishes in
us is more than application of truth already grasped.
Paul’s point is that truly grasping the truth of the
cross and being transformed cannot be separated—and both
are utterly dependent on the work of the Spirit” (D. A.
Carson, The Cross
and the Christian Ministry: Leadership Lessons from 1
Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003], 65). “In
other words, there has not only been an objective,
public act of divine disclosure in the crucifixion of
God’s own Son, but there must also be a private work of
God, by his Spirit, in the mind and heart of the
individual” (Carson,
The Cross and the
Christian Ministry, 52). As he rightly suggests,
human cognition needs to be restored to its proper
function (Ibid., 53-55), so that we can overcome our
self-centeredness and see clearly (Ibid., 55, 65-66).
Therefore, “those without the Spirit are so dead that it
is folly to think that arguments can bring them to
faith” (Ibid., 45, cf. 52). David Chang-Nyon Kim summary
is pertinent: Carson can speak of God’s “work of
revealing the hiddenness of the gospel (external
revelation) and renewing believers’ sinful heart and
mind (internal revelation) so that he may understand the
gospel” (Kim, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in the
Interpretation of the Word of God,” 56). For a similar
view to Carson’s, see Erickson, Christian Theology,
247-256.
[xxxii]Alfred
North Whitehead compares revelation (i.e., the
theological principia) to a “special occasion” in
the life of a person that provides the central clue for
interpreting the other occasions (Alfred North
Whitehead, Religion in the Making [New York:
Macmillan, 1926], 32). Or, more notably, H. Richard
Niebuhr contends that
revelation is like a “luminous sentence” amidst a
complex argument, “from which we can go forward and
backward and so attain some understanding of the whole”
(H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation
[New York: Macmillan, 1941], 61, cf. 93). In other
words, revelation is a “paradigm shift” that results in
the person’s once distorted picture coming clearer as a
result of the Word and Spirit. (The term, “paradigm
shift,” is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn’s historical
analysis of scientific theory [cf. idem, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); see
also Ian Hacking, ed.,
Scientific
Revolutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981)].) As a paradigm shift, Daniel Migliore continues,
it “is an event that shakes us to the core” (Migliore,
Faith Seeking Understanding, 21; cf. Exod 3:1-21;
Isa 6:1-8; Gal 1:12). Namely, revelation consists not
merely of more information, but rather, “when God is
revealed, everything is seen in a new light” (Ibid.,
22). The special principia result in shift in
worldview.
[xxxiii]Esther
Lightcap Meek, Longing to Know: The Philosophy of
Knowledge for Ordinary People (Grand Rapids: Brazos,
2003), 46-50, 141-145. Meek summarizes, “Human knowing .
. . involves actively struggling to rely on a collection
of as yet unrelated particulars to achieve a focus on a
coherent pattern or whole. It is a skilled coping with
the world through achieving a coherence, an integrated
pattern, a making sense of things, that opens the world
to us” (Ibid., 56). Knowing thus involves three
dimensions: the clues, the struggle, and the focus
(Ibid.). As such, “The act of knowing actively involves
the human agent” within it (Ibid., 58). Meek is
particularly reliant on the heretofore explained tacit
knowledge theory of Michael Polanyi (cf. Ibid., 9-10).
[xxxiv]Polanyi,
Knowledge and Being, 148.
[xxxv]John
Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology
(London: SCM, 1966), 80. While Macquarrie is not in the
same theological camp as this dissertation, his words in
this instance accurately reflect much of the Reformed
tradition. Calvin, for instance, notes that the rainbow
“is merely a refraction of the rays of the sun on the
opposite clouds” and have no material “efficacy in
restraining the waters” as God promised Noah.
Nevertheless, he continues, it remains true that God
instituted the rainbow as a sign so that “whenever we
behold it, we read this promise of God in it, that he
would never more destroy the earth with a flood.”
Therefore, he writes, if any man might ridicule our
simplicity of faith, contending for the scientific
nature of such clouds, we can “smile on his stupidity in
not acknowledging God as the Lord and Governor of
nature, who uses all the elements according to his will
for the promotion of his own glory” (idem, Institutes,
4:14.18). In a similar way, creation reveals God, but
only to the extent that he has chosen. In other words,
“Without faith there is no perception of revelation”
(Morris, I Believe in Revelation, 37).
[xxxvi]“It
is as if he said: Therefore the Lord began to show
himself in the visible splendor of his apparel, ever
since in the creation of the universe he brought forth
those insignia whereby he shows his glory to us,
whenever and wherever we cast our gaze” (Calvin,
Institutes, 1:5.1).
[xxxvii]Specifically,
Plantinga creatively asserts that the believer, after
being illuminated, may perceive God in (1) creation and
(2) Scripture and thereby rationally conclude that God
(1) created and sustains the world and (2) spoke
Scripture as his word. Christianity, he continues,
epistemically includes these two “basic beliefs” (among
others), that is, beliefs that are basic “in the sense
that [they are] not accepted on the evidential basis of
other propositions” (idem, Warranted Christian Belief
[New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], 175, cf.
180). In other words, following John Calvin’s sensus
divinitatis along with the inward testimony, these
beliefs may immediately be formed in the mind given the
fact that they are “produced by cognitive faculties or
processes that are working properly, in an appropriate
epistemic environment . . . according to a design plan
that is aimed at truth [and] successfully aimed at
truth” (Ibid., 256, cf. 180, 190, 259, 262). The
internal testimony of the Spirit, summarizes Randal
Rauser, is a “doxastic process that is designed to
produce beliefs about God that could not otherwise be
gained given our fallen noetic faculties” so that such
knowledge (i.e., the gospel and its implications towards
the world) through the Spirit is, following Calvin,
“revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts” (Randal
Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 246).
Therefore, because God reveals himself in this internal
capacity, believers possess a rational justification or
warrant for their knowledge. Notably, while Plantinga is
generally a faithful (if sometimes anachronistic)
interpreter of Calvin, there are two pertinent areas
where the two differ: Plantinga attributes to Calvin an
interest in rational justification and his account of
self-authentication is different than Calvin’s (cf. Paul
Helm, John
Calvin’s Ideas [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004], 267).
[xxxviii]The
Reformers, for instance, could not speak of knowledge or
revelation accept as they correlate with both the Word
(creation) and Spirit (illumination) (see Chapter 4,
“Reformation and Post-Reformation Eras”).
[xxxix]Latourelle,
Theology of Revelation, 383. He thus argues for
the “twofold dimension of the Word of God” (Ibid.).
Namely, “Its efficacy as external word is joined by a
particular efficacy which comes from the divine activity
penetrating the very heart of all of the activity of our
intellect and will, predisposing us for the response of
faith” (Ibid., 385).
[xl]Kuyper,
Principles of Sacred Theology, 343. As he argues,
this kind of truth would apply even if humanity had not
sinned. Therefore, “neither observation nor reasoning”
would be enough; rather, one needs a direct, personal
revelation from God (Ibid.). See also Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics,
1:207, 497; Morris, I Believe in Revelation,
70-71, 122.
[xli]As
Scripture says, the fear of the Lord is the principle (tyviare, i.e., beginning, foundation) of wisdom (Ps 111:10) or of knowledge (Prov
1:7); or rather, Jesus Christ is the principle (avrch,,
i.e., beginning, foundation) of creation (Col 1:18; Rev
3:14). Therefore, the source or cause of all things is
the triune God himself. See also Bonaventure,
Breviloquium, 27:
theology “deals principally with the First
Principle—God, three in one. . . .” Some theologians in
the early church argued that God the Father is
technically the
principium essendi. Augustine, for example, asserted
that the Father is “the principle of the whole divinity”
(lit. principium
totius divinitatis, Augustine,
On the Trinity,
4:20) which means, in other words, the principle of
being or existence of the Godhead. However, it is more
helpful, following John Calvin, to view each person of
the Trinity as
autotheos, and thus, the Trinity as a whole is the
principium
(Calvin,
Institutes, 1:13.25, 29; cf. B. B. Warfield,
Calvin and
Augustine [Phillipsburg: P & R, 1980], 283-284).
[xlii]Turretin,
Institutes of
Elenctic Theology, 2:15.33.
[xliii]The
language here echoes Barth’s Revealer, Revelation, and
Revealedness (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed.
G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance [Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1961], 1.1.361).
[xliv]Namely,
language includes a “locutionary act” (the basic meaning
and reference of a statement), an “illocutionary force”
(the semantic cogency that the speaker intends to
accomplish in the locution), and a “perlocutionary
force” (the statement considered by its effect upon its
recipient). These three are delineations from J. L.
Austin, the founder of this theory, who wanted technical
terms to explain the content, intent, and result of
language (cf. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with
Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed.
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975], 1-164).
Vanhoozer has also correlated Speech Act Theory with the
three persons of the Trinity in a similar manner (cf.
Vanhoozer, First Theology, 227-8).
[xlv]Irenaeus,
Against Heresies, 1:22.1; 2:30.9; 5:1.3; cf.
James Beaven, An Account of the Life and Writings of
S. Irenaeus: Bishop of Lyons and Martyr (London: J.
G. F. & J. Rivington, 1841), 88, 89; John Behr,
Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38; John
Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus
(London: Epworth, 1948), 125.
[xlvi]Vanhoozer,
Remythologizing Theology, 366. Therefore, the
internal principium corresponds to the Spirit’s interior
working in the
Testimonium et
Illuminatio
Internum Spiritus Sancti (“Testimony and
Illumination of the Spirit”). Vanhoozer also
acknowledges this without using the same language (Ibid.).
He says, “What finally makes the call effectual is its
content—the story of Jesus—as ministered by the Spirit.”
(Ibid., 374). This is the difference between “externally
authoritative” and “internally persuasive” discourse
(Ibid., 365).
[xlvii]Webster,
Holy Scripture, 89. This is why A. W. Tozer is so
severely critical of those who believe that “if you
learn the text you’ve got the truth,” for they “see no
beyond and no mystic depth, no mysterious heights,
nothing supernatural or divine. . . . They have the text
and the code and the creed, and to them that is the
truth” (A. W. Tozer, “Revelation is Not Enough,”
Presbyterian Journal 28:41 [Feb 1970]: 7-8).
[xlviii]Cf.
Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation, 61, cf. 93.
[xlix]This
does not mean, however, that objective revelation (i.e.
the Bible) without subjective revelation is not
revelation at all (cf. Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, Bloesch,
and Webster). The mistake of these proponents is that
they improperly assume that the ontology of revelation
necessarily includes its function, and thus when the
function of the Scriptures is unfulfilled—that is, the
purpose to bring people to saving faith—they wrongly
assume that revelation is not present (see for example
Webster, Holy Scripture, 14, 16). It is better to
say that both are revelations regardless of the
fulfillment of the purpose.
[l]Webster,
Holy Scripture, 16.
[li]In
this sense, one may take issue when Webster declares
that “revelation is not to be thought of as the
communication of arcane information or hidden truths”
(Ibid., 14). Depending upon what he means by “arcane”
and “hidden,” one wonders how revelation can exist
without information and truth. In this sense, Webster is
misguided to suggest that revelation is simply “God’s
own proper reality” (Ibid.).
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