[i]While it may be objected that the terminology of principia is outdated and/or modern, this kind of objection does not stand. The conception of the principia, whether explicitly or implicitly, is at the basis of any subject of study. In doing theology, for example, the Christian person is forced to make a decision to begin with revelation (cognoscendi) or God (essendi); likewise, he or she must choose to begin either with the work of Christ (cognoscendi) or the person of Christ (essendi) in their Christologies. The person is required, in other words, to make decisions concerning ultimate principles or foundations of his or her own theological or philosophical systems. Naturally, a person must undergird his thought before he elaborates, lest his argument be open to objections. This is the purpose of the principia. It simply refers to the foundation of being (principia essendi), that is, God; or the foundation of knowledge (principia cognoscendi), that is, revelation. Whatever terms one uses to argue this point does not matter. The fact is that these arguments are necessary, whether one is a coherentist, (modified) foundationalist, or pragmatist; whether one is a rationalist, empiricist, or realist.

[ii]For discussions of the definition of principia, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. E. W. Webster et al., in vol. 8 of Great Books of the Western World, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), Book I; for a more theological description, see Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:207-208; or Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:93.

                 The nature of the principia in relation to Christian theology is aptly summarized by Muller: “When the question of principia is considered casually, we again raise the question of an essential or external foundation since theology obviously is not self-caused. In addition to this external ground, all disciplines also have their own inward or internal basis, a principium belonging to that discipline itself” (Muller, PRRD, 1:440; see 440ff.). For the development of the principia in Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, see Muller, PRRD, 1:90-92; 437-440; for the Reformed background, see Ibid., 121-132, cf. 29, 39, where Muller attributes to Charles Hodge, Louis Berkhof, and others an orthodox or classical variety of the Reformed principia. As Muller concludes, the principia—and the prolegomena, of which the principia are part—“arguably provides the best point of entry into the theology of the late sixteenth and seventeeth centuries” (Ibid., 43). The terminology of principia, while most explicitly used within the Reformation and Post-Reformation eras, thus have strong precursors in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, along with the theology of Augustine and Bonaventure. While the external/internal distinction within the principia and revelation is a classically Reformed distinction, other traditions use the principia in complementary ways. For a Roman Catholic perspective on these issues, and on issues of foundations and prolegomena in theology in general, see Thomas G. Guarino, Foundations of Systematic Theology: Theology for the Twenty-First Century (New York: T & T Clark, 2005). In fact, René Latourelle rightly argues that the Catholic tradition in fact supports the external and internal distinction in revelation (Latourelle, Theology of Revelation, 377-387). For an Anglican perspective of the principia of theology through the lens of the Thirty-Nine Articles, see W. H. Griffith Thomas, The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1930). For a Lutheran perspective, see Carl E. Braaten, Principles of Lutheran Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) or Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 3^rd ed., trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1899). For a natural theology perspective on the principia, see George Hayward Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology, 3^rd ed. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1934).

                 The principia can also refer to more narrow realities; for example, they can refer to the specific principia of Christian theology as inspired Scripture (principia theologiae specialis), or they may denote mathematical principles undergirding reality (i.e., principia mathematica). For the former, see Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 355-356, cf. 341-563 (who also can speak of the principia in terms of general and special [cf. 348-405]). For the latter, see John Craige, a friend of Isaac Newton, in John Craige, Theologiae Christianae Principia Mathematica (London: House, 1699); cf. Richard Nash, John Craige’s Mathematical Principles of Christian Theology (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). 

                 As Turretin asserts in the Reformed context, “The principle [of theology] is both external (the word of God which embraces the law and the gospel—the former setting forth the things to be done, the latter those to be known and believed, hence called the ‘mystery of godliness’ and ‘the word of life’) and internal (the Spirit who is a Spirit of truth and sanctification, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, Is. 11:2)” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., 3 vols. [Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1992], 1:7.6). (Turretin asserts this twofold truth in the context of establishing that theology is both theoretical and practical, or rather, “theoretico-practical” [cf. Ibid., 1:7.1-15].) Muller also explains that, by the two principia of theology, external and internal, Turretin means that there are two “foundations,” for “theology obviously is not self-caused” (Muller, PRRD, 1:440, cf. 430-450; cf. 2:202-205).

[iii]While not the inspiration for this dissertation, Louis Berkhof argues similarly that, just as theology contains a principium cognoscendi externum and internum, so also do the “non-theological sciences,” namely philosophy (i.e., epistemology) (cf. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:93-97).

[iv]The term, “general sciences,” here intends to include all the physical or natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, etc.), the social sciences (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.), as well as the formal sciences (e.g., mathematics, logic, philosophy, etc.). In other words, the term is meant to encompass any study of natural, social, human, or mental reality. As he develops his Principles, Kuyper likewise uses the term to denote both the “hard sciences” as well as the “soft sciences” (Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 122).

[v]“God’s beautiful creation, replete with divine wisdom, is the principium cognoscendi externum of all non-theological sciences” (Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:94).

[vi]Namely, if the special internal principles is the illumined mind, then the general internal principle is the unilluminated mind itself, that is, the mind of the natural person. While one should also include the human conscience as the internal correlate (following the biblical data before), the mind is the more generalized form. Namely, while the mind is the (material) source of human cognition, the conscience is the source of morality, a source that no doubt finds its greater foundation within the human mind. Indeed, theologians have long attested that the mind of the human is a revelation of God, for it is the highest material expression of rationality in the universe. This is why John Calvin correlated the internal sensus divinitatis (“sense of divinity”) with an innate and general preconception of divine knowledge in all human persons (he writes, “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty” [Calvin, Institutes, 1:3.1; cf. 1:3.2-3; Edward Adams, “Calvin’s View of Natural Knowledge of God,” IJST 3 [2001]: 280-292). This is also why Augustine, in large measure, found the highest revelation of God as triune within his consciousness or mind, playing with themes such as intellect, memory, knowledge, and love to display the reality of the Trinity (Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan, in vol. 3 of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983], books 9-12). Indeed, it would be odd to understand anything other than the mind as being the internal receptacle of revelation, for it is person’s cognition that, among other things, is restored so that they believe (regeneration) and know (illumination) spiritual realities.

[vii]As Kuyper and Hodge have rightly noted, knowledge in the general sciences thus includes a threefold relation: the subject of science (the scientist and his/her cognitive capacity), the object of science (the universe), and the law(s) governing science (the scientific laws). See Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 257; cf. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:9-10. In other words, revelation and knowledge both include the subject, object, and subject-object relation within their definitions (cf. Harriet A. Harris, “A Diamond in the Dark,” in Religion, Pluralism, and Public Life: Abraham Kuyper’s Legacy for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Luis E. Lugo [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 128). 

[viii]Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:95. For Kuyper’s explanation of the relationship between the natural world and consciousness, see Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 355-368. God’s epistemic work here is Trinitarian. In the same way that the Logos enables all knowledge, so also the Spirit is the source and agent of all life in humanity and the world (cf. Gen 1:2; Ps 33:6; 104:30; 139:7; Job 26:13; 33:4), especially the intellectual, ethical, and spiritual life (Job 32:8; Isa 11:2).

[ix]Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:95. Justin Martyr is one of the earliest theologians to argue this idea (see his Second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho, a Jew, and the Discourse to the Greeks, in ANF, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, vol. 1 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956], 188-272). However, he had a tendency to abstract an unbeliever’s knowledge (through the Logos) from the salvific implications of the Logos. As such, his theology tended to be too optimistic about people’s knowledge of even spiritual matters. (See especially his comments paralleling Moses and Plato [idem, First Apology, 182].) The Dutch Reformed tradition, while rightly returning to foundation of knowledge in the Christ as Logos, also correctly distinguished the “sphere sovereignty” of natural knowledge and saving knowledge (Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:95; cf. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953], 112).

[x]Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, 92; cf. idem, Principles of Sacred Theology, 83, 92.

[xi]Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), esp. 15, 17, 48, 69-131; cf. Stefania Ruzsits Jha, Reconsidering Michael Polanyi’s Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 68, cf. 51-69; Jerry H. Gill, The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyi’s Postmodern Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2000), 51-55. Stefania Ruzsits Jha also argues for a neo-Polanyian development wherein active empathy (humane passion) and heuristic striving (intellectual passion) are added to the internal pole of knowing (Jha, Reconsidering Michael Polanyi’s Philosophy, 202). For a shorter summary, see idem, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). Polanyi’s work has even been correlated with John Calvin and Albert Einstein (see Iain Paul, Knowledge of God: Calvin, Einstein, and Polanyi (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic, 1987). 

[xii]Michael Polanyi, Knowledge and Being, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 148. Indwelling describes an innate epistemic process whereby, as we direct our attention on a focal object by way of our subsidiary awareness, we interioriorize and integrate the object and thereby perceive the greater dimension. For the most direct explanation of indwelling, see Andrew T. Grosso, Personal Being: Polanyi, Ontology, and Christian Theology (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 24-27. Jerry Gill admirably summarizes Polanyi: “[Polanyi’s model] construes reality as structured according to a hierarchy of dimensions that interpenetrate and mediate one another in a vectorial pattern by means of boundary conditions and rules. The richer, more comprehensive dimensions are mediated in and through the lesser, without being explainable in terms of them” (Gill, The Tacit Mode, 37). Gill thus explains epistemic indwelling: it is “the process of immersing oneself in the particulars of subsidiary awareness by means of embodied activity until these particulars come together as a meaningful whole in an ‘integrative act’” (Ibid., 52). Indeed, one cannot recognize a mood on a person’s face or a species of rock simply through an explanation of external variables. This fact, he explains, is proof that knowing is external as well as internal (Michael Polanyi, “The Logic of Tacit Inference,” in Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969], 156).

[xiii]Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855), §120.

[xiv]In other words, the unbelieving person can understand many things from creation. The atomic physicist can know, understand, and assess an atom’s behavior (in relation to mass, acceleration, and velocity), properties (its quark components, various spins and charges), and cosmic history (where and when that atom was at t₁, t₂, and so on). The artist can glimpse Albert Bierstadt’s sublime landscapes or Louis Le Vau’s majestic architecture and perceive the inherent symmetry and beauty. The stoic cosmologist can gaze upon the exceeding grandeur, harmony, and improbability of the universe and postulate a divine, rational principle that transcends it. In other words, and perhaps obviously, the natural person can see the world on its own terms.

[xv]K. Scott Oliphint, God with Us: Divine Condescension and the Attributes of God (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), 130. Oliphint specifically implicates that knowledge is dependent upon “God” himself; this author simply added “the triune God” to his remarks.

[xvi]This language alludes to Irenaeus’s Trinitarian structure (Irenaeus, Against Heresies, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, trans. Alexander Roberts and William Rambaut, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe [Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1885 [On-line], accessed 20 September 2010, available from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm; Internet, ed. Kevin Knight, 2:30.9; 3:24.2; 4:20.1; 4:38.3). For an excellent discussion that places the essence and function of truth within the larger domain of the triune God, see Bruce D. Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[xvii]As Calvin writes, God “fills, moves, and quickens all things by the power of the same Spirit, and does so according to the character that he bestowed upon each kind by the law of creation” (Calvin, Institutes, 2:2.16). Calvin argues that even the “natural capacities” of man are in fact supernatural. He calls this “the seed of the knowledge of God” (Ibid., 1:5.15). Or, he calls it “some sort of divinity,” a “seed” that cannot be “uprooted” (Ibid., 1:4.4). As he continues, however, “this seed is so corrupted that by itself it produces only the worst fruits” (Ibid.). Therefore, while all people have access to the data of the created world, and many even have Scripture itself; every person knows something only as the Holy Spirit allows it. As Calvin often and incessantly (though not exclusively) speaks positively and vividly of the “admirable light of truth shining in secular writers:” he writes, “Those men whom Scripture calls ‘natural men’ were, indeed, sharp and penetrating in their investigation of inferior things. Let us, accordingly, learn by their example how many gifts the Lord left to human nature even after it was despoiled of its true good” (Ibid., 2:2.15). Because God bestowed so many gifts upon human nature, therefore, the whole enquiry of human study—even “by the work and ministry of the ungodly”—are gratifying and essential. So much so, that “if we neglect God’s gift freely offered in these arts, we ought to suffer just punishment for our sloths” (Ibid., 2:2.16, cf. 2:2.15). As heretofore mentioned, Bavinck also speaks of all knowledge of “nature and history” that we apply in business, commerce, industry, arts, and sciences as a result of the revelation of God: “For all these elements of culture exist only because God has implanted in his creation thoughts and forces that human beings gradually learn to understand under his guidance” (Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:341).

                 In this sense, all knowledge and revelation is supernatural. Bavinck argues this idea cogently (see idem, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:307-312). Abraham Kuyper rightly asserts that, even though sin powerfully distorts the human person and mind, God, through his general grace, allows us to understand the world in large measure. He contends that God’s “[r]evelation . . . does not cease with sin; nothing can annihilate the omnipresence of God, not even sin; nor can man’s dependence as image upon the archetype be destroyed, neither can the mystical contact of the infinite and the finite in the human soul be abolished” (Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 276). There is, in fact, no supernatural/natural distinction within knowledge or revelation (Ibid., 1:355-361). And yet, this distinction remains alive among some Christian theologians today (see, for example, Alister McGrath, who distinguishes between the knowledge of God that is “naturally” available and only “revealed” [cf. Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, 4^th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 153-172]). Given the framework argued in this thesis, it is difficult to establish some knowledge of God that is purely “natural” and other knowledge that is “revealed.” The distinction breaks down when one considers, as Calvin and Bavinck argue, that all knowledge, no matter what the content, is ultimately supernatural as it is derived and enabled by God.

[xviii]Bavinck concludes, “But if that is the case, if in virtue of its nature religion has its own external principle of knowledge (principium cognoscendi externum), then there also has to correspond to it a unique internal principle of knowledge (principium cognoscendi internum). Just as the eye answers to light, the ear to sound, the logos (reason) within us to the logos (rationality) outside of us, so there has to be in human beings a subjective organ that answers to the objective revelation of God” (Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:505). He continues, “Eventually, all philosophers of religion are finally and willy-nilly brought to the recognition that human beings are by nature religious beings, that they are akin to God, and his image” (Ibid.; cf. Ibid., 1:233). See also Ibid., 207-233, 501-507; Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 67, 260.

[xix]In this context, it may be helpful to note the parallel between knowledge and revelation. Indeed, science and theology—or rather, knowledge and revelation—are closely associated and contemporaneous in the Christian worldview. Anything classified as knowledge in any subject of study is a by-product of God’s own self-revelation—whether explicitly known or not, whether general or special, whether external or internal. Namely, as the dissertation has asserted, just as God has created the world (and all that is in it), so also creation (and all that is in it) reveals God. “Thus the whole world is an embodiment of the thoughts of God” (Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:94; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:301-322). In short, there is no knowledge without God’s revelation. “God conveyed this knowledge to man by employing the Logos, the Word, as the agent of creation” (Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:94). Therefore, Berkhof continues, “Instead of ‘the world as God’s creation’ we might also say ‘God’s revelation in nature” (Ibid.). The logic necessarily follows: knowledge and revelation are not mutually opposed, but rather (all) knowledge itself is based upon revelation. One can know a scientific truth only insomuch as he or she bases such an observation or theory upon God’s self-revelation, specifically, the revelation of God in his creation (his laws, order, governance, and harmony).

                 Indeed, just as revelation assumes three aspects—one who reveals himself, the one to whom he reveals himself, and the possibility and actuality of the relation between these two—so also science contains three elements—the subject of science (the scientist), the object of science (the universe), and the law(s) governing science (the scientific laws) (Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 257; cf. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:9-10). As the question of revelation (as external and internal) raises the question of knowledge, therefore, so also it forces us to speak of knowledge as external and internal. To say it simply: because revelation and knowledge are two siblings in one family under the organic unity of God, just as revelation must consider the external and internal components, so also must knowledge. An insightful commentary on this point is made by John Macquarrie, who argues that revelation necessarily expresses itself in “calculative” thinking (following Heidegger) as well as “existential” thinking (probably following Barth), so that, just as revelation contains two dimensions, so knowledge must also (John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, 2^nd ed. [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977], 90-96). Given the different assumptions of Macquarrie, of course, he implicates something beyond the argument of this dissertation.

[xx]Calvin, Institutes, 1:5.12.

[xxi]While overstated, Bonaventure is helpful: “Thus, theology is the only perfect science, for it begins at the very beginning, which is the First Principle [God], and continues to the very end, which is the everlasting reward; it proceeds from the summit, which is God Most High, the Creator of all things, and reaches even to the abyss, which is the torment of hell” (Bonaventure, Breviloquium, trans. and ed. Dominic V. Monti, vol. 9, Works of St. Bonaventure [Saint Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2005], 28). In other words, as he parallels science and theology, Bonaventure suggests that theology is the only complete science as it contains the correct perception of the world and the gospel itself. 

[xxii]One could connect the internal principium cognoscendi to the regenerating and illuminating work of the Spirit, on the one hand, or its human result, faith, on the other (for the former, see Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:207; for the latter, see Rom 10:17; Gal 3:3, 5; Heb 11:1, 3; cf. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:97). This inward principle may also be biblically identified as spiritual rebirth (John 3:3, 5), purity of heart (Matt 5:8), doing the will of God (John 7:17), or the anointing of the Spirit (1 John 2:20). The question is simply a matter of terminology and emphasis. Nevertheless, for the sake of perceiving the unity of the Triune God in all his activity, this chapter will consider the work of the Holy Spirit the internal dimension.

[xxiii]Irenaeus, Against Heresies, in vol. 1 of ANF (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 3:17.2.3.

Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan, in vol. 3 of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 15.2; cf. idem, Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. Edward B. Pusey, in vol. 1 of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 13.1. He previously defines faith simply: “what is believing unless it is to agree to that which is said is true” (idem, On the Trinity, 13.1).

[xxv]Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 1:97. 

[xxvi]McGrath, Christian Theology, 241.

[xxvii]For the latter, see Plato: as he suggests, the person “has the ability to uplift the best part of the soul toward the contemplation of the best in things that are in the real world.” Plato’s words here apply to his conception of recollection (anamnesis) or the dialectic (cf. Plato, Republic, in vol. 6 of Plato, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, LCL [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013], 532C-D, cf. 531D-534D). For a modern proponent of religious contemplation towards knowledge, see John Hick, Who or What is God?: And Other Investigations (New York: Seabury, 2009), esp. 14-30.

[xxviii]Vos, Biblical Theology, 20, cf. 69. As he helpfully suggests, the Spirit’s internal redemption does not only affect our perception of general revelation, but also special revelation (Ibid., 20-22). For example, as Kuyper argues, regeneration (or, as he prefers, palingenesis) restrains the noetic effects of sin and produces the newfound ability to see the universe as it really is (i.e., illumination) (Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 299). He writes, “Here we affirm that in every domain palingenesis revivifies the original man as ‘a creature of God,’ and for no single moment abandons what was given in the nature of man” (Ibid.). In other words, the Holy Spirit, “by illumination, enables the human consciousness to take up into itself the substance of the Scriptures,” leads us to “ever richer insights into its content,” and imparts “personal application of the Word” that is “intended and indispensable for them” (Ibid., 402). Following Kuyper’s basic trajectory, Geerhardus Vos likewise argues, “The main correction, however, of the natural knowledge of God cannot come from within nature itself: it must be supplied by the supernaturalism of redemption” (Vos, Biblical Theology, 20). For an excellent discussion of this idea, see Schumacher, Divine Illumination, 62-64. For further discussion of the work of the Spirit in relationship to hermeneutics, see David Chang-Nyon Kim, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Interpretation of the Word of God” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012). For a Roman Catholic appraisal of regeneration (i.e., justification=regeneration) that drives towards epistemological implications of the doctrine, see Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 162-169.

[xxix]As Kuyper contends, the problem is twofold: namely, a formal one whereby the disorder of the sinner must be neutralized, and a material one, where the knowledge of God must be extended to include the knowledge of God’s relation to the (now) sinner (Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 275). This problem is augmented by palingenesis (or regeneration) and illumination, on the one hand, and special revelation, on the other. For the former, see Ibid., 150ff., 280-281, 288-289, 298, 327, 345, 361, 402, 415, 508, 554; for the latter, see Ibid., 275, 327, 361. This is why Dirk van Keulen argues that Kuyper’s theological epistemology consists of three aspects: special revelation, regeneration, and illumination (cf. Dirk van Keulen, “The Internal Tension in Kuyper’s Doctrine of Organic Inspiration of Scripture,” in Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of his Life and Work, ed. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn [Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999], 124).

[xxx]Kevin Vanhoozer, Is there Meaning in this Text? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 413-414; idem, First Theology: God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2002), 233-234. See also the previous discussion in this chapter (“Internal Reality of Revelation”).

[xxxi]As D. A. Carson asserts, “What the Spirit accomplishes in us is more than application of truth already grasped. Paul’s point is that truly grasping the truth of the cross and being transformed cannot be separated—and both are utterly dependent on the work of the Spirit” (D. A. Carson, The Cross and the Christian Ministry: Leadership Lessons from 1 Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003], 65). “In other words, there has not only been an objective, public act of divine disclosure in the crucifixion of God’s own Son, but there must also be a private work of God, by his Spirit, in the mind and heart of the individual” (Carson, The Cross and the Christian Ministry, 52). As he rightly suggests, human cognition needs to be restored to its proper function (Ibid., 53-55), so that we can overcome our self-centeredness and see clearly (Ibid., 55, 65-66). Therefore, “those without the Spirit are so dead that it is folly to think that arguments can bring them to faith” (Ibid., 45, cf. 52). David Chang-Nyon Kim summary is pertinent: Carson can speak of God’s “work of revealing the hiddenness of the gospel (external revelation) and renewing believers’ sinful heart and mind (internal revelation) so that he may understand the gospel” (Kim, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Interpretation of the Word of God,” 56). For a similar view to Carson’s, see Erickson, Christian Theology, 247-256.

[xxxii]Alfred North Whitehead compares revelation (i.e., the theological principia) to a “special occasion” in the life of a person that provides the central clue for interpreting the other occasions (Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making [New York: Macmillan, 1926], 32). Or, more notably, H. Richard Niebuhr contends that revelation is like a “luminous sentence” amidst a complex argument, “from which we can go forward and backward and so attain some understanding of the whole” (H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation [New York: Macmillan, 1941], 61, cf. 93). In other words, revelation is a “paradigm shift” that results in the person’s once distorted picture coming clearer as a result of the Word and Spirit. (The term, “paradigm shift,” is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn’s historical analysis of scientific theory [cf. idem, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2^nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); see also Ian Hacking, ed., Scientific Revolutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)].) As a paradigm shift, Daniel Migliore continues, it “is an event that shakes us to the core” (Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, 21; cf. Exod 3:1-21; Isa 6:1-8; Gal 1:12). Namely, revelation consists not merely of more information, but rather, “when God is revealed, everything is seen in a new light” (Ibid., 22). The special principia result in shift in worldview.

[xxxiii]Esther Lightcap Meek, Longing to Know: The Philosophy of Knowledge for Ordinary People (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2003), 46-50, 141-145. Meek summarizes, “Human knowing . . . involves actively struggling to rely on a collection of as yet unrelated particulars to achieve a focus on a coherent pattern or whole. It is a skilled coping with the world through achieving a coherence, an integrated pattern, a making sense of things, that opens the world to us” (Ibid., 56). Knowing thus involves three dimensions: the clues, the struggle, and the focus (Ibid.). As such, “The act of knowing actively involves the human agent” within it (Ibid., 58). Meek is particularly reliant on the heretofore explained tacit knowledge theory of Michael Polanyi (cf. Ibid., 9-10).

[xxxiv]Polanyi, Knowledge and Being, 148.

[xxxv]John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM, 1966), 80. While Macquarrie is not in the same theological camp as this dissertation, his words in this instance accurately reflect much of the Reformed tradition. Calvin, for instance, notes that the rainbow “is merely a refraction of the rays of the sun on the opposite clouds” and have no material “efficacy in restraining the waters” as God promised Noah. Nevertheless, he continues, it remains true that God instituted the rainbow as a sign so that “whenever we behold it, we read this promise of God in it, that he would never more destroy the earth with a flood.” Therefore, he writes, if any man might ridicule our simplicity of faith, contending for the scientific nature of such clouds, we can “smile on his stupidity in not acknowledging God as the Lord and Governor of nature, who uses all the elements according to his will for the promotion of his own glory” (idem, Institutes, 4:14.18). In a similar way, creation reveals God, but only to the extent that he has chosen. In other words, “Without faith there is no perception of revelation” (Morris, I Believe in Revelation, 37).

[xxxvi]“It is as if he said: Therefore the Lord began to show himself in the visible splendor of his apparel, ever since in the creation of the universe he brought forth those insignia whereby he shows his glory to us, whenever and wherever we cast our gaze” (Calvin, Institutes, 1:5.1).

[xxxvii]Specifically, Plantinga creatively asserts that the believer, after being illuminated, may perceive God in (1) creation and (2) Scripture and thereby rationally conclude that God (1) created and sustains the world and (2) spoke Scripture as his word. Christianity, he continues, epistemically includes these two “basic beliefs” (among others), that is, beliefs that are basic “in the sense that [they are] not accepted on the evidential basis of other propositions” (idem, Warranted Christian Belief [New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], 175, cf. 180). In other words, following John Calvin’s sensus divinitatis along with the inward testimony, these beliefs may immediately be formed in the mind given the fact that they are “produced by cognitive faculties or processes that are working properly, in an appropriate epistemic environment . . . according to a design plan that is aimed at truth [and] successfully aimed at truth” (Ibid., 256, cf. 180, 190, 259, 262). The internal testimony of the Spirit, summarizes Randal Rauser, is a “doxastic process that is designed to produce beliefs about God that could not otherwise be gained given our fallen noetic faculties” so that such knowledge (i.e., the gospel and its implications towards the world) through the Spirit is, following Calvin, “revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts” (Randal Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 246). Therefore, because God reveals himself in this internal capacity, believers possess a rational justification or warrant for their knowledge. Notably, while Plantinga is generally a faithful (if sometimes anachronistic) interpreter of Calvin, there are two pertinent areas where the two differ: Plantinga attributes to Calvin an interest in rational justification and his account of self-authentication is different than Calvin’s (cf. Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 267).

[xxxviii]The Reformers, for instance, could not speak of knowledge or revelation accept as they correlate with both the Word (creation) and Spirit (illumination) (see Chapter 4, “Reformation and Post-Reformation Eras”).

[xxxix]Latourelle, Theology of Revelation, 383. He thus argues for the “twofold dimension of the Word of God” (Ibid.). Namely, “Its efficacy as external word is joined by a particular efficacy which comes from the divine activity penetrating the very heart of all of the activity of our intellect and will, predisposing us for the response of faith” (Ibid., 385).

[xl]Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 343. As he argues, this kind of truth would apply even if humanity had not sinned. Therefore, “neither observation nor reasoning” would be enough; rather, one needs a direct, personal revelation from God (Ibid.). See also Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:207, 497; Morris, I Believe in Revelation, 70-71, 122.

[xli]As Scripture says, the fear of the Lord is the principle (tyviare, i.e., beginning, foundation) of wisdom (Ps 111:10) or of knowledge (Prov 1:7); or rather, Jesus Christ is the principle (avrch,, i.e., beginning, foundation) of creation (Col 1:18; Rev 3:14). Therefore, the source or cause of all things is the triune God himself. See also Bonaventure, Breviloquium, 27: theology “deals principally with the First Principle—God, three in one. . . .” Some theologians in the early church argued that God the Father is technically the principium essendi. Augustine, for example, asserted that the Father is “the principle of the whole divinity” (lit. principium totius divinitatis, Augustine, On the Trinity, 4:20) which means, in other words, the principle of being or existence of the Godhead. However, it is more helpful, following John Calvin, to view each person of the Trinity as autotheos, and thus, the Trinity as a whole is the principium (Calvin, Institutes, 1:13.25, 29; cf. B. B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine [Phillipsburg: P & R, 1980], 283-284).

[xlii]Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:15.33.

[xliii]The language here echoes Barth’s Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1961], 1.1.361).

[xliv]Namely, language includes a “locutionary act” (the basic meaning and reference of a statement), an “illocutionary force” (the semantic cogency that the speaker intends to accomplish in the locution), and a “perlocutionary force” (the statement considered by its effect upon its recipient). These three are delineations from J. L. Austin, the founder of this theory, who wanted technical terms to explain the content, intent, and result of language (cf. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975], 1-164). Vanhoozer has also correlated Speech Act Theory with the three persons of the Trinity in a similar manner (cf. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 227-8).

[xlv]Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1:22.1; 2:30.9; 5:1.3; cf. James Beaven, An Account of the Life and Writings of S. Irenaeus: Bishop of Lyons and Martyr (London: J. G. F. & J. Rivington, 1841), 88, 89; John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38; John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London: Epworth, 1948), 125.

[xlvi]Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 366. Therefore, the internal principium corresponds to the Spirit’s interior working in the Testimonium et Illuminatio Internum Spiritus Sancti (“Testimony and Illumination of the Spirit”). Vanhoozer also acknowledges this without using the same language (Ibid.). He says, “What finally makes the call effectual is its content—the story of Jesus—as ministered by the Spirit.” (Ibid., 374). This is the difference between “externally authoritative” and “internally persuasive” discourse (Ibid., 365).

[xlvii]Webster, Holy Scripture, 89. This is why A. W. Tozer is so severely critical of those who believe that “if you learn the text you’ve got the truth,” for they “see no beyond and no mystic depth, no mysterious heights, nothing supernatural or divine. . . . They have the text and the code and the creed, and to them that is the truth” (A. W. Tozer, “Revelation is Not Enough,” Presbyterian Journal 28:41 [Feb 1970]: 7-8).

[xlviii]Cf. Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation, 61, cf. 93.

[xlix]This does not mean, however, that objective revelation (i.e. the Bible) without subjective revelation is not revelation at all (cf. Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, Bloesch, and Webster). The mistake of these proponents is that they improperly assume that the ontology of revelation necessarily includes its function, and thus when the function of the Scriptures is unfulfilled—that is, the purpose to bring people to saving faith—they wrongly assume that revelation is not present (see for example Webster, Holy Scripture, 14, 16). It is better to say that both are revelations regardless of the fulfillment of the purpose.

[l]Webster, Holy Scripture, 16.

[li]In this sense, one may take issue when Webster declares that “revelation is not to be thought of as the communication of arcane information or hidden truths” (Ibid., 14). Depending upon what he means by “arcane” and “hidden,” one wonders how revelation can exist without information and truth. In this sense, Webster is misguided to suggest that revelation is simply “God’s own proper reality” (Ibid.).