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An Irony of History:
Descartes’, the Fideist, and Subsequent Rationalism
In modern America God has been officially
banished. I say, “officially,” as eighty-two percent of the
American population believe in or practice Christianity at some
level of commitment, while another seven percent are Mormon,
Jewish, Pantheist or Muslim (Barna). Only eleven percent are
“Skeptics.” Yet, Christianity is virtually banished from the
primary and secondary campuses of America. Christians have had
to fight vigorously in the court system just to have voluntary
clubs on school premises. Prayer before state and national
legislatures still exists in various forms, but they are quite
generic. “Under God” still exists on our coins and in our pledge
of allegiance, but in reality these retentions remain tokenism,
and strong forces are trying to banish even that remnant.
In a nation whose population was
overwhelming Christian in its origin, culturally and
politically, how did God become “officially” banned? How did
America produce Humanist Manifestoes I, II, and III that do not
allow for any “supernatural” power? I submit that this change
took place because of the progressive influence of a radical
rationalism that grew out of the Enlightenment which eventually
produced evolutionism, scientism, logical positivism, and
secular humanism. And, herein is one great irony of history. René
Descartes (1596-1650), who is called the “Father of Modern
Philosophy,” and even the “Father of Rationalism,” made God, not
man, his first philosophy: the foundation of his being able to
reason with certainty.
His
Meditations on First Philosophy contains a rather
considerable description of the character of God. In his First
Meditation, he begins to introduce this God, as “(He) who is
able to do anything and by whom … I have been created” (21). He
has “obtained steady possession of my mind.” He suggests that
God may have brought about all those “extended things” and other
images with which his mind is constantly engaged. “Perhaps God
has not willed that I be deceived in this way for he is said to
be supremely good. Let us not oppose his activity in my thinking
at this stage in my reasoning.” As Descartes contemplates a
powerful demon who might deceive him, he knows that the God “who
is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth” will not.
In Mediation II, Descartes continues about
this God “who instills these very thoughts in me.” But that is
his only mention of God in this meditation, as He proceeds to
discuss his possibly malevolent demon and his “Cogito,” as the
basis for sound reasoning through this stage of his mediations.
In Mediation III, the reader is not
surprised about Descartes’ attention to God, as its title is,
“Concerning God, That He Exists.” He admits of a “preconceived
opinion about the supreme power of God and that he has yet no
reason to think him a deceiver or even that he exists” (36). He
moves on to discuss the origin of his ideas, “… some appear to
me to be innate, some adventitious, and some produced by me”
(38). Then, he speaks of the “light of nature” and “natural
impulses,” which concepts at this stage of his reasoning are
unclear (38). He progresses to “ideas (being) formed in me
without any help” (39). He moves to “ideas that display
substances to me … (of a) more objective reality,” but “the idea
that enables me to understand a supreme deity, eternal,
infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things
other than himself, clearly has more objective reality” (40).
For sure, this God has been described in some detail! We are
getting to know a great deal about his character and attributes.
“It follows that something cannot come into
being out of nothing, and also what is more perfect cannot come
into being from what is less perfect” (41). He argues that point
for several paragraphs. Finally, “there remains only the idea of
God…. I understand by the name ‘God’ a certain substance that is
infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely
powerful that created me along with everything else that
exists…. I must conclude that God necessarily exists” (45). “My
perception of God is prior to my perception of myself” (45).
Descartes does not name “all the remaining perfections of God,”
but clearly he has an idea that God is more than he has already
described (47). Later, he says, “I have taken the ideas of the
various perfections I attribute to God from a variety of
causes…. the unity, the simplicity … the inseparability of all
those features that are in God is one of the chief
perfections….” (50). “I have somehow been made in his image and
his likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which the
idea of God is contained, by means of the same faculty by which
I perceive myself” (51).
He concludes his argument, thus far, by
grounding all his certainty in God:
The whole force of the argument rests on
the fact that I recognize that it would be impossible for me to
exist, being of such a nature as I am (namely having in me the
idea of God), unless God in fact did exist…. a being having all
those perfections that I cannot comprehend… a being subject to
no defects whatever (51).
He ends this Third Meditation wanting to
take a break from it “to spend some time contemplating this God,
to ponder his attributes … to gaze upon the beauty of this
immense light…. the greatest felicity of the next life
(consisting) solely in this contemplation of the divine
majesty….” (52). This statement shows his personal worship of
the wonders of this God.
In Mediation Four Descartes calls him “the
true God” (54). He has no “trickery” or “deception” and thus no
“maliciousness” or “weakness.” Descartes has within himself “a
certain faculty of judgment, which … I undoubtedly received from
God.” Descartes again finds God to be a “supremely perfect
being.” The remainder of this meditation discusses how this
faculty, while not perfect, as God’s is, nevertheless allows
Descartes to reason clearly.
Meditation V is entitled, “Concerning the
Essence of Material Things, and Again Concerning God That He
Exists,” so the reader anticipates more discussion about God.
He then distinguishes God from man. “Existence can no
more be separated from God’s essence than … having three angles
equal to two right angles can be separated from the essence of a
triangle” (66). Later, he limits God to being one. “I cannot
understand how there could be two or more Gods of this kind”
(68). So, Descartes has moved from his
Cogito to grounding
his clarity of thought in God to this ontological argument for
God’s existence!
In Meditation Six Descartes grounds the
possibility of understanding sensory objects in the fact that
God could not be a “deceiver” about “corporeal things” (80),
that I have “a faculty given me by God for the purpose of …
understanding nothing other than the combinations of all the
things bestowed upon me by God” (80), and that because of all
this (his whole argument in these mediations), “I am in no way
mistaken in these matters” (90).
A Summary of Descartes’
God, an Observation, and a Suggestion
Descartes’ God is all-powerful
(omnipotent); the creator of Descartes’ and all things out of
nothing; not a deceiver (he is not the powerful demon that
Descartes feared in the beginning of his meditations); extremely
good; one who implants ideas into minds (that is, intuited or
innate); eternal, infinite, and omniscient; independent and
supremely intelligent; unity and simplicity; the ground of all
existence; perfection with no defects whatever; immense light;
creator of man in his own image with faculties of mind that
provide the ability to know with certainty; and finally, the
only being whose essence cannot be separated from his existence.
His only omission from the Christian idea of God would be the
idea of the Trinity, which was not necessary to his project.
Descartes was educated by Jesuits and lived
in France where Catholicism was virtually unopposed by
Protestantism after the Bartholomew’s massacre of the Huguenots
in 1572. It is fascinating that in making his best attempt to
know only that which was certain, that he twice grounded his
reason in God’s character. That character was consistent with
that of the Catholic Church both then and now. Also, it is
amazingly consistent with the idea of God in Protestantism, for
example, Chapter Two, “Of God, and the Holy Trinity,” of the
Westminster Confession of Faith (1643-1648), a concise,
conservative Protestant statement about God.
The Father of Modern Philosophy and of
Reason not only did not find reason inconsistent with the
biblical idea of God, confirmed by both Catholics and
Protestants, but found it necessary to ground his reason in the
perfect attributes of God. Modern rationalists, who find no
place for the supernatural in their reason, will at least find
irony in their claim to rationalism when contrasted with that of
Descartes. They may even begin to see that rationalism is not
inconsistent with belief in God, but that He is necessary for
the grounding of reason itself.
* Numbers refer to the pagination in
Oeuvres de Descartes,
publiés par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, 13 volumes, Paris:
Cerf, 1897-1913, from which our textbook was translated: René
Descartes, trans. Donald A. Cress,
Discourse on Method and
Meditations on First Philosophy, 4th Ed.,
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998).
Bibliography
Barna Group. “America’s Seven Faith Tribes
Hold the Key to National Restoration.”
http://www.barna.org/barna-update/article/13-culture/262-americas-seven-faith-tribes-hold-the-key-to-national-restoration
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